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Executive Summary
 The old standing committee system, though vital to the legislative process, was deemed
ineffective by numerous commentators on parliament and had long faced pressure for reform.
Ad hoc and unspecialised, standing committees lacked many of the features characteristic of
effective committees found in other parliaments around the world.
 In November 2006, under the chairmanship of Jack Straw, the Modernisation Committee
published a report on The Legislative Process, which proposed that most government bills
beginning their parliamentary passage in the House of Commons would be sent to a ‘public
bill committee’ (PBC). Such committees would be empowered to receive oral and written
evidence, in addition to holding traditional line-by-line scrutiny sittings, thus bringing
potential to better inform members, involve the public, and improve the quality of
parliamentary scrutiny.
 This report reviews the experience of PBCs in the 2006-07 and 2007-08 parliamentary
sessions, and concludes that the reforms have been successful in adding value to the
legislative process, but that more could be done.
 The appearance of expert witnesses before PBCs has increased the quality and quantity of
information available to committee members. The reforms have enhanced transparency of
briefing by outside organisations, providing an official platform to inform and influence
parliament’s consideration of legislation.
 Members of PBCs are (perhaps compelled to be) more engaged with the task of legislative
scrutiny, and backbenchers are becoming more confident participants in the committee stage.
Debate is more fruitful, and the flexibility of each PBC to divide its time between witness and
detailed scrutiny sessions as it sees appropriate, is welcome.
 PBCs nonetheless suffer from problems that require addressing if their benefits are to be
maximised. Their timetabling limits members’ ability to deliver effective scrutiny, with
insufficient time to prepare for the committee stage, or to reflect on what is learnt through
evidence-taking before moving to line-by-line scrutiny. It is proposed that adequate fixed
gaps need to be built into the process to correct this.
 A lack of committee ownership over witness selection, at present an opaque process
orchestrated via the usual channels, is a key grievance. This report recommends that the
committee itself should determine its timetable and list of witnesses.
 Concerns that committee memberships fail to reflect the balance of opinion in the House of
Commons also need to be addressed. One possible reform would be to alter the composition
of the Committee of Selection to diminish whip influence.
 Some of this report’s recommendations are simple and easily achievable. For example an
increase in resources to facilitate the running of PBCs, and better publicity for the new
committees. Other changes, such as those with respect to the timing of PBCs, require a
change in attitudes towards scrutiny which may be harder to achieve. The most radical, and
potentially most beneficial, reform would be to move to a system of permanent expert
legislation committees to parallel the well-respected select committees.
 Although some of the more ambitious proposals suggested here may not happen quickly, the
innovation of PBCs has the potential to encourage a significant shift in culture towards
legislation in the Commons, which may in time lead to further reforms. In the meantime, the
new committees should certainly be welcomed and encouraged.67
Preface
In November 2006 the House of Commons approved a series of changes recommended by its
Select Committee on Modernisation that altered the procedures by which parliament scrutinises
government bills. The committee stage of the legislative process in the House of Commons, the
stage where bills are examined in detail, was overhauled in the interests of achieving enhanced
scrutiny and a more informed and accessible legislative process. Standing committees, as were,
were re-named ‘public bill committees’ and endowed with the power to call witnesses and receive
written submissions from interested and expert bodies external to parliament, in the course of
their scrutiny of a bill. To a limited extent, these committees have become more like select
committees.
The introduction of public bill committees was an important innovation in the way the House of
Commons scrutinises legislation. But it has not been subject to any evaluation. We encouraged
Jessica Levy to pursue her Masters dissertation at UCL on this topic. It was a good dissertation,
so she was later invited to develop it - following further research - into a report for the
Constitution Unit. This is the result.
The report draws on a series of almost 30 interviews with many of the key players in public bill
committees to date – government and opposition spokespersons, backbenchers, clerks and
witnesses – and an examination of documents relating to all such committees in the 2006-07 and
2007-08 sessions. It is the first comprehensive study to review the work of the new committees.
Public bill committees have been described as ‘a step and a half in the right direction.’ In this
report Jessica sets out many of their benefits, and also recommends a series of further
improvements. If her recommendations are accepted, these important new committees will be
moving more strongly in the right direction and making a real contribution to the scrutiny of
legislation.
Professor Robert Hazell
Director, The Constitution Unit8
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Methodology
This investigation developed from an initial 10 000 word dissertation completed as part of a
Masters course. The methodology began with a detailed study of all the PBCs held during the
2006-07 and 2007-08 sessions. Via the parliamentary internet and intranet data was gathered on
the size, chairmanship, clerkship, dates and number of sittings, number of evidence sessions,
amount of written evidence, number and identity of witnesses and host government department
for each PBC. These statistics were collated and are presented in summary in Table 2. The
Hansard reports of the initial debates on the programme motions in each PBC were read in detail,
and many of the subsequent witness sessions and line-by-line scrutiny sittings of the committees
were skimmed for relevant information. The debates on the programme motion were often when
members took the opportunity to raise concerns they had with the procedure of these
committees. In addition to this desk research, a handful of committees were attended – both
witness and line-by-line scrutiny sessions.
The research was given context through study of past parliamentary reforms and inquiries on the
subject of parliamentary modernisation, both those conducted within and external to parliament.
All printed information about the process of bringing these reforms into practice and how the
new system operates was sought. As this report is the first comprehensive study on the
introduction of PBCs to be published, the only information available was official output, either
from the Modernisation Committee, the Scrutiny Unit, the Commons Library, or in Hansard.
The principal methodology, however, was a series of 29 in-depth interviews. Interviews were
conducted with members of the Chairmen’s Panel, government ministers, Conservative and
Liberal Democrat front bench spokespeople, backbenchers, clerks and other parliamentary
officials, witnesses who had appeared before PBCs, civil servants, and the media. All interviews
were recorded for accuracy and permission was sought to use referenced quotations in the report.
The request of those interviewees who wished to remain anonymous has been respected. Where
quotations appear from an interview, no reference is included in the text. Where a quotation is
from Hansard, a reference is given in a footnote.1011
Section 1: The Reforms to Create Public Bill Committees
The old standing committee process and its critics
Standing committees were introduced to the British political system by William Gladstone in
1882, though they had been proposed as early as the 1850s by the Commons’ most famous Clerk
of the House, Sir Thomas Erskine May (Seaward & Silk 2003: 157). The committees were
provided for by standing order in 1888, but it was not until 1906 that it became standard practice
for all public bills, except money bills and those of the highest constitutional importance, to be
examined in detail by a standing committee following second reading in the House of Commons.
Though procedure in these committees was originally to be ‘as in Select Committee, unless the
House shall otherwise order’, it soon came to resemble that in committee of the whole House. In
other words, standing committees operated as mini representations of the Commons chamber,
adversarial in nature, and presided over by a chair in a role comparable to that of the Commons
Speaker. As with other committee types, and in other parliaments around the world, standing
committees were introduced in the interests of alleviating pressure on time on the floor of the
House. Dividing the membership of the House of Commons into smaller groups that could
share some of the legislative and scrutiny tasks between them allowed more time for other
business to be taken in plenary. Criticised though it has been, the standing committee system
came to be regarded as ‘an indispensable part of parliamentary machinery’ (Walkland 1979: 254).
With regards to parliament’s legislative capacity, standing committees were described, even
recently, as ‘the most important part of the House’s consideration of bills’ (Blackburn & Kennon
2003: 6-131).
The basic structure of standing committees was formulated during the period of the Liberal
government of 1906-14. The original two standing committees of the late nineteenth century,
which had specialised in legal and trade bills, were replaced by four committees, each dealing with
bills irrespective of their subject. These standing committees were identified by letters of the
alphabet – standing committee A, B, C etc. – a practice which continued until the 2006 reforms
under investigation in this paper. The number of standing committees grew to five in 1945, and
to ‘as many as…necessary’ in 1948 (House of Commons Information Office 2008). Before the
most recent changes there were often up to ten standing committees convened each
parliamentary session.
Standing committee membership in the first half of the twentieth century was large and divided
into two parts – a substantial permanent membership topped up with up to 15 additional
members for particular bills. Several changes were made to reduce the size of these committees,
from 80 to 40 members by 1919 and then to a more familiar average of 20 members by 1945.
The committees had earned their ‘standing’ prefix on account of each having a large permanent
nucleus of members. In 1960 this feature was scrapped, however, following recommendations by
the House of Commons Procedure Committee, which argued that committees should be
constituted afresh for each new bill
1. As a result, while the ten or so committees formed each
session in recent years existed for the entire session, each new bill that was brought before a
particular committee prompted the reconstitution of the committee’s membership. Hence despite
the persistence of the name ‘standing’, these committees were in fact entirely ad hoc. An
additional change to the membership of standing committees had a lasting effect on their
operation and effectiveness. In 1947, party whips were appointed to standing committees thus, in
the opinion of Seaward and Silk, marking ‘the end of [standing committees’] relative
independence from the party battle in the House’ (2003: 159).
1 See Procedure Committee 1995, quoting HC 92 of Session 1958-59.12
The inconsistency between the committees’ nomenclature and how they were constituted is just
one unusual feature of British standing committees that contributed to them being considered
atypical of comparative committees overseas. Legislative committees elsewhere differ according
to their status, powers and structure, with the most active and effective committees
characteristically being permanent, specialised, and with jurisdictions mirroring government
departments. A strong committee system, able to have ‘a significant independent impact on
public affairs’ (Shaw 1998b: 237), is more likely if committees are cohesive, a feature associated
with a permanent membership (Arter 2003: 73); if political parties play a small role in who is
chosen to sit; if the committees are able to consider bills before they are discussed in plenary
(Shaw 1998a: 789); and if they are supported by generous staffing. The power to receive oral and
written evidence boosts a committee’s expertise, although it is recognised that this is likely to be
naturally fostered as permanent committee members accumulate knowledge over time. In some
parliaments, legislative committees double up with executive oversight functions conducted by
our select committees, with the same members responsible for both bill and departmental
scrutiny. The UK’s standing committee system displayed none of these features and has
consequently long been regarded as an oddity. Though UK standing committees were more in
line with the Commonwealth experience, their difference from the US and European equivalent,
significantly their lack of specialisation and permanence, has stymied their effectiveness. The
urgency for reform is understandable if one considers the opinion of Mattson and Strøm, that
‘strong committees…are at least a necessary condition for effective parliamentary influence’
(1995: 250).
The UK’s standing committee procedure, which was deemed ripe for reform in 2006, was
adversarial, often obstructive, and at times inefficient. A bill would enter its committee stage and
be debated, clause-by-clause, in a manner which followed the adversarial procedure of the plenary
chamber. At the end of debate on each clause a vote would be taken to decide whether that
clause (possibly in an amended form) ‘stand part of the bill.’ While second reading provided the
opportunity to discuss the principle of the proposed legislation, the theory was that committee
stage should focus on how to apply the government’s proposals to that principle. In practice, this
was not always achieved. Attitudes developed which declared that the government’s duty was to
defend their bill and that their backbenchers were there to vote and keep quiet. For the
opposition, members favoured tactics of delay and obstruction. The consequence was that the
later clauses and sometimes whole parts of some bills were passed without any examination, with
unsatisfactory consequences; for example in the case of the Child Support Act 1991, which
introduced the Child Support Agency. The introduction of programming in 1997 reduced the
opposition’s ability to obstruct progress and prevent the end of a bill ever being reached. The
tone of proceedings nonetheless remained adversarial, very different from the more consensual
approach of select committees.
Standing committees before the 2006 reforms were procedurally supported by the Public Bill
Office, which mainly provided procedural (and not analytical) guidance for the committee chair
and some assistance with amendments tabled by opposition and backbench members. Again,
unlike select committees, standing committees had no other permanent staff or resources to help
their members with briefings and preparation, making effective scrutiny a particularly challenging
task for opposition and backbench members unsupported by the research muscle of the civil
service. When aspects of a bill were not clear to a member, no direct mechanism existed for
questions to be asked of the government side. Instead, all points of query had to be presented in
the form of amendments to the bill. These so-called ‘probing’ amendments came to dominate
standing committee proceedings (Modernisation Committee 2006a: summary).
Probing amendments, described as a ‘complete waste of time’ by one individual interviewed for
this investigation, sparked just some of the criticism of the old standing committee process which13
prompted its reform. In their evidence to the Modernisation Committee’s inquiry which
recommended the changes under examination here, the Hansard Society summarised the
criticisms of the work of standing committees as follows: ‘[standing committees] fail to deliver
genuine and analytical scrutiny of [bills], their political functions are neutered, dominated almost
exclusively by government…, they fail to engage with the public and the media (in contrast to
select committees) and they do not adequately utilise the evidence of experts or interested parties’
(quoted in Modernisation Committee 2006a: para 50). Standing committees were a toothless
scrutiny mechanism. Professor (and now member of the House of Lords) Philip Norton wrote,
‘[standing committees] are poorly equipped for the purpose for which they are appointed, achieve
relatively little in terms of policy effect, and are usually the subject of recommendations for
reform’ (1998a: 36). Writing a few years later for the Hansard Society, Declan McHugh
concluded that the UK’s ineffective legislative committee system required ‘radical surgery’ (2004:
118). Just after the Modernisation Committee reported with its recommendations for reform,
Professor Robert Hazell wrote that ‘inadequate scrutiny of legislation [remains] the greatest single
scandal in the House of Commons’ (2007: 12).
Commentators and parliamentary practitioners alike criticised the government-dominated nature
of standing committees, which left the impact they could make in terms of scrutiny ‘sporadic’
(Norton 2005: 93) or ‘frequently patchy and haphazard’ (Brazier 2004: 19-20). The presence of
whips on standing committees and whip influence over membership selection made these
committees inflexible both in terms of timing and cross-party cooperation. It became accepted
that the government’s backbench members would more likely be chosen because of their loyalty
to the party than due to any particular interest in the bill. Instead of engaging in debate and
scrutiny, these members could be relied upon to toe the line.
Often adversarial, if not acrimonious, standing committees also received criticism for their
inability to engage parliamentarians and the wider public in the procedures of legislative scrutiny.
Richard Crossman noted the boredom of standing committees, describing them as ‘inane’ and a
waste of time (1975: 561; 1977: 903). J.A.G. Griffith agreed that ‘standing committee work,
except for the main protagonists, can be tedious’ (1974: 52) and Bernard Crick described
membership as ‘a thankless task’ (1970: 88). Andrew Tyrie MP (Conservative) reported reactions
from colleagues on both sides of the House to a ‘desperate’ and ‘dire’ standing committee
process; a ‘pointless ritual’ that disfigured the legislative process (2000: 11).
Standing committees’ ad hoc membership compounded all the difficulties caused by the features
of their status and procedure described above. Membership which exists only for the course of
one bill (which is likely to spend at most a couple of months going through committee) provides
little chance for the creation of camaraderie between members or a cohesive committee spirit.
What is essentially a fleeting commitment to scrutiny neither engenders the accumulation of
knowledge about particular policy areas in MPs, nor a habit of scrutinising, which has
implications for the culture within parliament (to be discussed at the close of this paper). As
Philip Norton has commented, ‘there is still a long way to go in the institutionalisation’ of the
UK’s legislative committees (1998b: 153).
Calls to reform standing committees have featured in numerous inquires on parliamentary reform.
In its seminal investigation into the British legislative process, Making the Law, the Hansard
Society concluded that parliament, especially the Commons, fails in its role of effective scrutiny,
suggesting that the ‘whole process is inefficient and highly unsatisfactory’ (1992: 78-79& 85). The
Conservative Party’s Commission to Strengthen Parliament reported in July 2000 and
recommended adding a degree of specialisation to the committee process through careful
selection of committee members (Norton Commission 2000: 41). In 2001 the Hansard Society’s
Newton Commission found that parliamentary scrutiny was ‘neither systematic nor rigorous’14
(Power 2001: 1). From within parliament, the Lords Constitution Committee and the Commons
Procedure and Modernisation Committees have produced numerous recommendations of
changes designed to make parliament more effective. Members of parliament such as Dr Tony
Wright (2004) have urged ‘relentless pressure and ingenuity’ on the part of reformers seeking to
change the culture within parliament to one where a strengthened legislature is considered a good
thing; to accept, in the words of the late Robin Cook, that ‘good scrutiny makes for good
government.’
Other models: special standing committees and select committees
Special standing committees – the precursor to public bill committees
Evidence-gathering legislative committees as recommended by the reforms under investigation
here are not a new phenomenon. It was that bills were to be examined in detail by such
committees ‘[a]s a matter of routine’ (Modernisation Committee 2006a: summary), which proved
to be the novelty of the 2006 reforms. Public bill committees (‘PBCs’ – the name given to the
new committees) were explicitly modelled on existing special standing committees (‘SSCs’) (ibid:
para 58). Used only intermittently since their introduction in 1980, SSCs provided a hybrid
approach to the committee stage of legislation, grafting up to three evidence sessions on to the
start of traditional line-by-line scrutiny. A median was sought between the perceived benefits for
effective parliamentary scrutiny of measured, consensual evidence-gathering and the traditional
adversarial approach of Westminster party politics characteristic of the existing standing
committee system.
Suggestions to combine the advantages of input by expert witnesses and fine detail scrutiny were
first mooted in the early 1970s. J.A.G Griffith’s Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (1974)
proposed a new format to the committee stage, one influenced by the recommendations of the
Procedure Committee (1971) to use select committees to scrutinise public bills, as is the practice
in some overseas parliaments (see above). Griffith suggested a committee that would operate in
two stages – first as an inquisitorial select committee taking evidence on the bill, and second as a
traditional standing committee (1974: 249-51). The Procedure Committee report (1978), famous
for leading to the development of departmental select committees, also recommended the
establishment of what it called ‘public bill committees.’
These proposals for an adapted committee stage were accepted by the government as a means to
improve bill scrutiny. The new committees, which came to be called special standing committees,
were introduced on an experimental basis in 1980. They were endowed with the capacity to hold
an initial private meeting to deliberate on how much evidence was to be held and which witnesses
would be asked to appear. SSCs could hold up to three investigatory sessions, and had the ability
to question the minister in charge of the bill if the committee so decided. The evidence-gathering
phase of special standing committee would have to be completed within 28 days of the end of a
bill’s second reading. After this time, the committee would proceed to line-by-line bill scrutiny as
usual practice. During the evidence-taking phase the chair of the relevant departmental select
committee would preside over proceedings, bringing his or her accumulated knowledge of the
subject area and familiarity with investigative enquiry to the questioning of witnesses. When the
SSC turned into a regular standing committee, the select committee chair was replaced by a
member of the Chairmen’s Panel (a group of senior backbenchers appointed by the Speaker).
The SSCs were accepted only as an experiment in 1980. The Standing Order changes lapsed after
one session but were renewed for an additional single session experiment in 1983. Over this two
year period only five bills were committed to the new variety of standing committee. All were15
relatively uncontroversial, and provoked little inter-party tension. On the advice of a further
Procedure Committee report (1985), the temporary Standing Orders governing SSCs were made
permanent in 1986 (Winetrobe 1996: 13). The Procedure Committee had received evidence
which was ‘virtually all…enthusiastic’ about the special committee procedure (1985: para 12). Yet
it was not until 1994 that a bill was again committed to a special standing committee.
In the quarter century that special standing committees had been available to be used, just nine
had been convened. The reticence to use the SSC procedure, as Rogers and Walters noted, likely
stemmed from ‘the government’s point of view…that the process [would] take more time and
that the party with the majority [would have] less control’ (2006: 223). However, close observers
of these committees (including some who contributed to this investigation) note that almost no
one who has actually sat on an SSC has expressed anything but praise for them. Indeed, Jack
Straw MP’s positive experience of giving evidence to the Immigration and Asylum Bill SSC in
1998-99 when he was Home Secretary can be seen as an important contributing factor to his
endorsement of the 2006 reforms and therefore their agreement by the House. Jack Straw was
Leader of the House and Chair of the Modernisation Committee in 2006 and responsible for
persuading his colleagues in government and parliament to adopt the committee’s
recommendations. Jacqui Smith MP (Chief Whip at the time the introduction of PBCs was
agreed, and the second crucial player in achieving a reform package which would be accepted by
the government and the House) had sat on the Adoption and Children Bill SSC in 2000-01 in a
previous role as Minister for Health. Her experience of a SSC is also thought to have played a
substantial part in agreeing the content of The Legislative Process reforms.
Select committees – superior scrutinisers
Select committees, in the opinion of Philip Norton, ‘constitute the most important parliamentary
reform of the [twentieth] century’ (1998a: 34). The Liaison Committee, commenting on the
success of the select committee system in its March 2000 report Shifting the Balance wrote:
…it has provided independent scrutiny of government… It has been a source of
unbiased information, rational debate, and constructive ideas. It has made the political
process less remote, and more accessible to the citizen who is affected by that
process…It has also shown the House of Commons at its best: working on the basis of
fact, not supposition or prejudice; and with constructive co-operation rather than routine
disagreement. (2000: paras 4-5)
Select committees have demonstrated that evidence-gathering can add to the effectiveness of
scrutiny. Witness sessions add value in the form of increasing the quantity and quality of
information available to MPs; they are a way of enhancing the collective knowledge of the
committee members. In addition, select committees are staffed by clerks, administrators and
committee experts, who organise their inquiries, advise on witness selection, and prepare and
publish their reports. Select committees are also able to employ special advisers to particular
inquiries to further add to the volume of expertise at their disposal. Committee output is
considered to be authoritative, and can be influential. This is boosted by the position of the
chairs of select committees who act as spokespeople for their committees, promoting committee
findings to parliament and to the media.
It is the permanent membership of select committees, however, which makes them stand out as
superior scrutinisers. In common with most legislative committees overseas, UK select
committees enable their members to specialise in a particular field of public policy. Members are
elected at the start of a parliament and sit as part of their committee for its duration. The ability
to specialise makes MPs more likely to be interested and engaged with their specific duties of16
scrutiny because they will be more informed. Select committee membership is popular and there
is considerable demand to join the more high-profile committees (Norton 2001: 324-25). Select
committee duties are a consensual and collective activity, adding to the positive public perception
of these bodies. The aim of select committees is to cooperate in order to seek improvements in
government policy where these are found to be necessary. As Robin Cook commented, achieving
a House of Commons which is effective in holding the government to account ‘should not be a
partisan issue’ (2001: para 2). They offer a different mode of operation (see King 1976) in a
political system characterised by the party political battle.
The Legislative Process – the Modernisation Committee’s report
When Robin Cook was its chair (2001-03) the Commons Modernisation Committee was at its
most engaged in suggesting reforms that would foster an effective legislature. Despite introducing
headline measures like devolution, Freedom of Information, and a Human Rights Act, New
Labour in office was not as committed to wholesale parliamentary reform as it had professed to be
in advance of the 1997 general election (Flinders 2002: 27). But as Leader of the House, Robin
Cook had succeeded in enthusing parliament of the need for change, encouraging the publication
of more bills in draft, orders relating to the carry-over of business, and reforms designed to
empower select committees. When Jack Straw became Leader of the House in 2006, he also
brought this modernising initiative to the role. A politician with a genuine interest in the position
of parliament, Jack Straw oversaw the publication of a report infused with the experience of past
inquiries and recommendations. Most of the recommended changes to standing committees
contained in The Legislative Process (Modernisation Committee 2006a) were not new ideas.
However, while most previous proposals to inform members, involve the public, and improve
parliamentary output did not reach the point of being put formally to parliament, the majority of
the Modernisation Committee’s 2006 proposals were accepted and implemented.
In The Legislative Process, the Modernisation Committee sought to respond to some of the
criticisms of the way the House of Commons scrutinises legislation. The recommendations
concerning standing committees aimed at not only increasing access to, and understanding of, the
legislative process, by starting committees with evidence-gathering sessions, but also
recommended changes to the traditional clause-by-clause deliberation in the interests of better
scrutiny. It was hoped that through increased communication between those within and outside
parliament, informed, engaging and effective scrutiny would occur, resulting in better legislation.
The Modernisation Committee’s report recognised the importance of the legislative process as a
whole. It began with the words, ‘It is in making, or giving effect to the law that parliament
impinges most directly on individuals, by conferring on them a wide range of rights and duties’
(Modernisation Committee 2006a: para 1). Expressing a desire to make parliament as open and
democratic as possible in carrying out this key function, the Committee claimed that:
Members of parliament have no monopoly on wisdom; the government has no
monopoly on effective consultation. A system which allows the individual or organisation
who has spotted a way in which a pending piece of legislation might affect them to bring
this readily to the attention of the legislature is less likely to produce laws which are
defective or redundant or which lead to unintended (even unforeseen) consequences.
(ibid: para 2)
The committee made clear its intention to seek reforms which would help evoke a culture of
openness, where scrutiny was to be regarded as a benefit, not a hindrance, to good government.
This reforming attitude was to be applied throughout the legislative process, with the report17
calling for increased use of pre-legislative scrutiny and a longer lasting report stage, amongst
other recommendations. However, the Modernisation Committee acknowledged early on in its
investigation that the committee stage, much criticised and of particular importance due to its
responsibility for much of the substantive consideration of bills, warranted particular attention.
While not explicitly summarised by the Committee itself, the aims and intentions of the report’s
proposed changes to standing committees can be deduced as being as follows:
The Modernisation Committee acknowledged much of the criticism of standing committees as
valid, but urged that it was ‘important not to over-state the weaknesses of the system’ (ibid: para
51). Unable to disregard the adversarial tradition of British politics and the utility of partisan
debate in teasing out weaknesses in bills, the committee argued the importance of retaining
elements of the old system. The report stated, ‘We do believe that there is a strong case for
introducing a more collaborative, evidence-based approach to the legislative process…but it
should supplement, rather than supplant, traditional standing committee debates’ (ibid). As a
result, the proposed new system involved a hybrid of measures which would both add to the
existing system while retaining and improving elements of this system.
The case for including an element of evidence-gathering in the committee process – the headline
change of the 2006 reforms – was made through consultation on The Legislative Process, as well as
with reference to existing positive experience of holding witness sessions in select committees.
The Modernisation Committee had issued a consultation document (2006b) intended to canvass
opinion on options for an altered committee stage, but it received little attention. In its own
evidence sessions, however, conducted during the inquiry that would eventually produce The
Legislative Process, the committee heard calls from witnesses for the introduction of evidence-
taking. Groups including the TUC, CBI and The Law Society viewed evidence-taking as an
effective way of engaging the wider public and organised interests in the legislative process
(Modernisation Committee 2006a: paras 54-55). Academics, politicians and parliamentary officials
also had similar views. In addition to hearing from witnesses, the new committees would be able
Figure 1: Aims of the Modernisation Committee’s Report (HC 1097)
General aim:
 Make clause-by-clause scrutiny of bills more effective (para 74).
Specific aims:
 Increase the amount, quality and accessibility of information available to members
who sit on PBCs (summary, paras 53, 75).
 Increase the access to and influence of outsider stakeholders over parliament’s
consideration of bills. The legislative process should be as open as possible:
o the public should be able to observe every aspect of it
o they should have the opportunity to become involved in it as active citizens
(summary, paras 1, 2, 54, 55).
 Introduce a more collaborative, evidence-based approach to the legislative process
(para 51).
 Introduce a more flexible approach to the timetabling of bills
o remove restrictions on the timing and number of committee sessions
(summary, paras 46, 71).18
to receive written evidence from interested and expert bodies and individuals during the course
of scrutiny of the bill.
The Modernisation Committee’s report urged the retention of the detailed scrutiny sessions
which had comprised the existing standing committee stage. ‘Partisan debates can be a useful way
of testing the provisions of a bill’, the committee argued (2006a: para 51). But the report also
proposed that evidence-taking be made standard and recommended that the new committees be
given the freedom to decide how much of their time would be devoted to hearing from witnesses.
Select committee chairs familiar with the process of evidence-taking would preside over the first
part of the committee stage, with members of the Chairmen’s Panel assuming control for line-by-
line scrutiny. More notice was to be given for amendments, and innovations in the availability
and digestibility of committee papers were called for. To remove the long-standing ambiguity
surrounding the standing committees’ title, they were to be collectively renamed “public bill
committees”, with each committee named after the bill it was scrutinising, for example the
Pensions Bill Committee. The nomenclature changes unveiled in The Legislative Process introduced
the umbrella term ‘general committees’ to refer to PBCs, delegated legislation, European, grand,
and second reading committees. However, it is only PBCs to which the powers to take evidence
apply. (See Table 1 for details of the Modernisation Committee’s recommendations.)
The House of Commons debates the recommendations
The Legislative Process was published on September 7, 2006, and debated by the House of
Commons two months later
2. Its recommendations received cross-party support, as illustrated by
their acceptance without a vote
3. Then Leader of the House Jack Straw MP, despite not being in
the post at the time the topic of the report was decided upon, championed its proposals (and is
credited with having a prime role in the success of these reforms). In the debate he said: ‘The
motions before the House have the potential to deliver significant improvements to the business
of the Commons and the effectiveness of the legislative process. In so doing, they will help
Members to carry out their work and to strengthen their bond, and that of parliament more
generally, with the public, who we are here to serve’
4. Theresa May MP, then Shadow Leader of
the House, described the proposed changes to standing committees as ‘entirely sensible’
5. For the
Liberal Democrats, David Howarth MP welcomed changes which ‘will help to focus minds on
the purposes of bills’
6, and David Heath MP was confident the proposals for public bill
committees would commend themselves to the House
7.
It is important to note that in some respects the changes approved by the House of Commons
differed from the exact recommendations of The Legislative Process. When Jack Straw presented the
reform proposals to the House he was moving the motion on behalf of the government, rather
than as chair of the Modernisation Committee. It therefore reflected the government’s
judgements on what had been presented to it by The Legislative Process. The motion put before the
Commons was as follows:
That this House welcomes the First Report from the Select Committee on Modernisation
of the House of Commons on the Legislative Process (HC 1097); approves in particular
2 House of Commons Hansard, 1 November 2006: cols. 304-407.
3 While the main question passed without division, a vote was called on the issue of extending the notice period for
amendments. This was carried by 223 votes to 172 (House of Commons Hansard, 1 November 2006: col. 407).
4 ibid: col. 304.
5 ibid: col. 322.
6 ibid: col. 306.
7 ibid: col. 336.19
the proposals for the committal of bills to committees with powers to take evidence to
become the normal practice for programmed government bills which start in this House;
agrees that this be achieved by Standing Orders through the programming process, with
such committees having freedom to decide how many evidence sessions should be held;
agrees that the notice period for amendments to bills to be selected for debate in standing
committee should, subject to the discretion of the Chair, be extended from two days to
three days; supports the renaming of the various kinds of standing committee along the
lines proposed by the committee; and endorses the proposals for the gradual
development of improved documentation and explanatory processes relating to bills.
8
In contrast to the Modernisation Committee’s recommendations however, the government
proposed that instead of a change of chair as the committee stage moved from evidence-taking to
detailed scrutiny, PBCs would be chaired throughout by a member of the Chairmen’s Panel. The
government rejected the report’s recommendation that the programme motion moved at the end
of second reading should not contain the bill’s out-date (the date by which the committee
sessions have to be completed). In addition, while the government endorsed the proposals for
the development of improved documentation and explanatory processes relating to bills, it
emphasised a more gradualist approach to these changes than that suggested by the
Modernisation Committee. It is also important to note that the way in which the Standing Orders
were revised to accommodate the changes to committee procedure went against the
recommendations of the Modernisation Committee. Standing Order changes did not turn all
standing committees into SSCs, but kept standing committees and bolted onto them a bit of
select committee procedure. This inconsistency has been the root of many of the problems
encountered by the new committees, as discussed in Section 4.
In the debate on The Legislative Process the government attached several conditions to the
acceptance of the reforms. While both government and private members’ bills pass through a
public bill committee, only the former would be allowed to receive written and oral evidence. Of
these government bills, to qualify to call witnesses a bill would have to satisfy three conditions: it
must be programmed, it must have started its passage in the Commons, and it must not have
received pre-legislative scrutiny. All programmed bills before a PBC were allowed to receive
written evidence. This meant that while a bill which started in the House of Lords could receive
written evidence, a private member’s bill could not.
Table 1 provides a more detailed comparison between the committee’s recommendations, and the
changes which were agreed by the House of Commons.
8 ibid: col. 304.20
Table 1: Comparing the recommendations of The Legislative Process with what was accepted by the House of Commons
Issue to be reformed Recommended by The Legislative Process Accepted or rejected by House of Commons
Committal of government bills - That committees empowered to receive
written and oral evidence before clause-by-
clause scrutiny should become the norm for
scrutinising government bills which originate in
the Commons. These committees should be
renamed public bill committees (‘PBCs’).
Accepted. The House emphasised the need for
these bills to be programmed, have started in the
Commons, and not to have received pre-legislative
scrutiny.
Programming - The initial programme motion moved after
second reading should contain only a provision
that a bill be committed to a PBC, and that
proceedings be programmed.
- There should be a second programme
motion, moved one or two days later, to
establish the bill’s out-date from committee.
This is to allow account to be taken of what
was said during the second reading debate.
All proposals regarding the programming motion
were rejected. The House accepted the status quo
- the date a bill is to leave committee is to be
decided by a single motion passed at the end of
second reading.
Evidence-taking at committee stage - All PBCs should hold at least one evidence
session with the relevant minister and civil
service officials.
Accepted
Timing - That time restrictions on evidence-taking be
removed; it be up to the committee to
determine the division of the time available




Information about bills - The government should make available, to
MPs and the public, copies of the ministerial
briefing on how the bill would look if
amendments were agreed – a so-called
‘alternative text.’
- That guidance be produced on providing
explanatory statements (‘ES’) to amendments,
and that a pilot scheme on ES be conducted.
Government is expected to provide ES as a
matter of course.
- Introduce ‘legislation gateways’ and improve
access to and clarity of information in general
No mention during the debate on the report. In
practice this has not yet happened, but interviewees
indicated progress in this area is imminent.
Accepted. Pilots on explanatory statements have
been held. However, only some government
departments have complied with calls to produce
these for their amendments.
Accepted
Amendments - That the notice period for amendments be
extended by one day, to allow the committee
time to consider implications of amendments.
Accepted
Chairmanship - That the evidence-taking phase of PBCs be
chaired by a select committee chair; and the
line-by-line scrutiny by a member of the
Chairmen’s Panel.
Rejected. A member of the Chairmen’s Panel
would preside throughout, on account of the
scrutiny being of proposed legislation, and not
policy.2223
Section 2: Public Bill Committees So Far
How do they work?
The committee stage is the third formal phase of the legislative process in the House of
Commons; it follows the introduction of a bill at first reading and a second reading debate on the
bill’s broad principles. At the end of second reading (if it is agreed to take the bill forward) a
motion is put to commit the bill to a public bill committee under Standing Order 83(A). A date
by which the PBC must complete its deliberations is announced
9, but no other procedural
restrictions are placed on the committee. For example, in contrast to procedure for special
standing committees, a PBC’s out-date is not determined by the need to complete its evidence-
gathering within a set number of days after second reading, nor do PBCs have to meet just in
morning sessions. The committal of a bill to a PBC allows the committee to ‘send for persons,
papers and records’ in the manner of a select committee, as stipulated under changes to Standing
Orders (see Standing Order 84(A)) secured when these reforms were agreed. As recommended
by the Modernisation Committee, the PBC is free to decide how often it sits, and what
proportion of sittings will be devoted to evidence-taking, beyond the requirement to hold one
evidence session with the relevant minister and departmental officials.
As with the old standing committee process, each public bill committee is appointed solely for
the bill it is going to consider. There is no permanent membership, and PBCs disband once the
bill finishes its committee stage. The method of membership selection also remains consistent
with the pre-reform committee stage. The Committee of Selection
10 will formally choose who will
sit on a PBC, and it will meet on the Wednesday afternoon following the end of second reading.
The Speaker nominates seven members of the PBC (the minister, the Conservative and Lib Dem
spokespersons, two party whips, the minister’s PPS and one other government backbencher) to
form the Programming Sub-Committee (see Cabinet Office 2009). These members have
responsibility for setting the PBC’s internal timetable, and formally selecting which witnesses will
be invited to give evidence. When filling the places on a PBC, the Committee of Selection keep in
mind the need for the party balance in committee to mirror the composition of the House of
Commons itself. PBC membership can range from 16 to 50 MPs, but the norm is a committee of
around 17. Arrangements for chairing PBCs again follow the same lines as those of standing
committees. (As discussed above, this is in contrast to the recommendations of the
Modernisation Committee.) A member of the Chairmen’s Panel will be chosen to preside in an
impartial manner over committee proceedings, much as the Speaker does in the House of
Commons. To share the work-load often more than one chair is appointed. In this case they will
be from different parties.
Public bill committees on government bills meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays in morning and
afternoon sessions. If the Committee of Selection met on the Wednesday after second reading,
the first PBC meeting will tend to be the following Tuesday. During this intervening time the
programming sub-committee will meet to agree the timetable of the committee sessions, and, in a
crucial departure from the old standing committees, decide which witnesses will be invited to give
evidence. All parties will have a list of desired witnesses and attempts are made by the
government’s representatives to accommodate the wishes of the opposition. In the first instance
the whips will consult the civil servants in the department working on the bill (the ‘bill team’) for
a list of witness names. Subsequent negotiations take place through the mechanism of the usual
9 This out-date is arrived at following negotiations between the ‘usual channels’, the term used to refer to the
informal and secretive negotiations between the government and opposition whips.
10 A body of nine members – mainly whips – which meets weekly to select MPs to serve on PBCs, other general
committees, and select committees at the start of each parliament (Rogers & Walters 2006: 355).24
channels, effectively giving the government the upper hand. The decision reached at the
programming sub-committee is in effect the formal acceptance of a settled programme.
From an administrative point of view, the evidence-gathering undertaken by a PBC is organised
by the Scrutiny Unit, the specialist section of the Committee Office otherwise responsible for
providing help to select committees with financial and performance scrutiny of government and
for supporting committees scrutinising draft bills. Under the terms of the reforms, the Scrutiny
Unit, once given the list of proposed witnesses by the programming sub-committee, must contact
these individuals and arrange their attendance. Also a new feature of the PBC process, the
Scrutiny Unit provides briefing material on the bill for PBC members, coordinating with select
committee specialists and staff in the House of Commons Library. The Scrutiny Unit administers
all written evidence received throughout the committee stage.
At its first meeting the PBC first debates and agrees a programme motion tabled by the minister,
which is in the same terms as the resolution agreed by the programming sub-committee,
including the timetable for oral evidence sessions. It is then permitted up to half an hour to sit in
private. This period is intended as an organisational session for the committee members to
discuss and divide up lines of questioning. It is the first time that the members will have sat as a
full committee. On reconvening in public session, the PBC proceeds with evidence-taking, where
all members are able to take part in questioning. Written evidence can be accepted at the
discretion of the chair throughout the committee stage. Amongst the witnesses called, the
minister leading the bill (who is a member of the committee) along with departmental officials
will for one session be formally questioned by his or her committee colleagues. The minister and
officials usually appear as either the first or last witnesses of the evidence-gathering period,
although there is no protocol governing this. Some witnesses will appear alone, while others
appear alongside representatives from other bodies and organisations. Again, how this is
organised is down to the deliberations of the programming sub-committee (as well as witnesses’
availability to appear at particular dates and times).
The committees can take oral evidence at any point, although witnesses tend to appear during the
first week of the committee stage. Once witness hearings are completed the PBC progresses to
traditional line-by-line scrutiny. This shift is likely to involve not just a change in the mood of
proceedings, as consensual questioning is replaced with adversarial debate, but also a change of
location. PBCs usually conduct evidence-taking in a committee room in Portcullis House, with its
furniture arranged, as in select committee, in the shape of a horseshoe; and line-by-line analysis in
a room along the committee corridor in the Palace of Westminster, resembling a mini version of
the House of Commons chamber. It is during the detailed scrutiny phase of the committee
process that amendments to the bill can be suggested and debated. Amendments need to be
tabled three days before they can be raised in committee. During the second part of PBC
members will take an in-depth look at the entire bill, often debating clauses in sequence, as was
the practice of standing committees. A clerk from the Public Bill Office will sit with the chair
throughout both the evidence-taking and line-by-line stages of the PBC. The clerk is there to give
advice on procedure, not substance, and they will help with the drafting, grouping and selection
of amendments. Their role is therefore mostly focused on the second phase of the committee
stage.
In terms of information available to members of a PBC, The Legislative Process brought about
several innovations. The House of Commons Library now produces a report on the committee
stage which is published in time for the report stage, in addition to that which it already produced
in advance of second reading. Explanatory statements on amendments, which were introduced as
a pilot during the passage of a handful of bills in the 2007-08 session are set to become standard
practice. So-called ‘legislation gateways’ now exist on the parliamentary internet and intranet,25
providing a single, easily accessible location for all the information which members, witnesses,
and the public may need about a bill. The use of laptops in committee, enabling access to this as
well as other briefing material during committee sessions is being trialled. The publication of
‘alternative texts’ of the bill showing the impact of particular amendments is an innovation that
has had a slower introduction. While there is enthusiasm that these may soon appear, I
understand that the software that would provide them still lags behind the technology that would
be needed.
Once the PBC has completed clause-by-clause scrutiny, it reports the bill – in its amended form,
if changes have been made – back to the House of Commons.
Statistics on the 2006-07 & 2007-08 sessions
The nomenclature changes contained in the 2006 reforms meant that all bills not examined in
detail by a committee of the whole House, were sent to a ‘public bill committee’ for their
committee stage. Though only certain ones have the power to call both written and oral evidence,
bills which are subject to programme motions can receive written submissions. Programmed bills
that in addition start in the Commons and have not received pre-legislative scrutiny can also take
oral evidence from witnesses (Modernisation Committee 2006a: paras 58, 62, 73)
11.
In the first two sessions of their operation, 55 bills were sent to a PBC for detailed scrutiny at the
Commons committee stage. Of these, 29 were in the 2006-07 session, and 26 in the 2007-08
session. The majority of these (22 and 21, respectively) were on government bills and the
remainder on private members’ bills (plus one hybrid bill). This investigation focuses just on the
government bills, as these are the only category of bills covered by the new evidence-taking
powers. From 15 November 2006, all public bill committees on bills subject to a programme
motion could receive written evidence. The Leader of the House announced that, in order to
allow time for arrangements for the new system to be made, PBCs on bills introduced before
Christmas 2006 would not make use of their new oral evidence-gathering powers.
12 This meant
that just four bills were able to send for witnesses in this first session.
In practice, the first bill committee to put into use the power to seek ‘oral evidence at such
meetings as the committee may appoint’ (Standing Order 84(A)) was convened for scrutiny of
the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill. (This was despite this bill having
had its first reading on 12 December 2006.) In the first session to use the new committee format,
the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Bill, Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, and UK
Borders Bill also took written and oral evidence. Between them the first four committees to sit
under full public bill committee procedure held a total of 52 sittings, 14 of which were devoted to
evidence-taking. Altogether 70 witnesses appeared before a PBC in the 2006-07 session, and 221
pieces of written evidence were received and published as part of the committee consideration of
these bills. (The bills for this and the subsequent session are listed in Table 2.)
With the new procedure acting as standard practice by the 2007-08 session, all government bills
meeting the relevant criteria were sent to a PBC with the power to request witness appearances.
While bills which started in the House of Lords were scrutinised by a PBC they did not hold oral
11 While the context of this sub-section should make it clear where I am referring to PBCs collectively, or PBCs with
full evidence-taking powers, throughout the rest of the report PBCs, which can take both written and oral evidence,
are considered.
12 House of Commons Hansard, 1 November 2006: col. 308.26
evidence sessions
13. As a result, a total of 12 government bills were sent to a PBC empowered to
call for both written and oral evidence, and one, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, was
carried over from the previous session. These 13 committees met for 147 sittings, during 36 of
which witnesses were present. The PBCs heard from 229 witnesses and received 190 pieces of
written evidence.
Table 2: Bills scrutinised by a Public Bill Committee with full evidence-taking
powers, sessions 2006-07 & 2007-08














Child Maintenance & Other Payments Bill 17/07/2007 12 (2) 6 6
Criminal Justice & Immigration Bill
(carried over to 2007-08)
16/10/2007 8 (4) 24 183
Local Government and Public Involvement in
Health Bill
30/01/2007 18 (4) 18 17
UK Borders Bill 27/02/2007 14 (4) 22 15
Total 52 (14) 70 221
Session 2007-08
Banking Bill 21/10/2008 17 (2) 12 4
Channel Tunnel Rail Link (Supplementary) Bill 04/12/2007 1 (1) 3 0
Counter-Terrorism Bill 22/04/2008 14 (4) 15 8
Criminal Justice & Immigration Bill
(carried over from 2006-07)
20/11/2007 8 (0) 0 31
Education & Skills Bill 22/01/2008 20 (6) 41 18
Energy Bill 05/02/2008 15 (3) 37 14
Health & Social Care Bill 08/01/2008 12 (3) 24 35
Housing & Regeneration Bill 11/12/2007 17 (4) 24 13
National Insurance Contributions Bill 15/01/2008 2 (1) 4 0
Pensions Bill 15/01/2008 10 (4) 21 27
Planning Bill 08/01/2008 18 (4) 31 34
Political Parties & Elections Bill 04/11/2008 11 (3) 15 6
Sale of Student Loans Bill 04/12/2008 2 (1) 2 0
Total 147 (36) 229 190
(Source: constructed from information found via www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/s)
13 The Leader of the House had proposed to the Commons that such bills were unlikely to require oral evidence
sessions, or at any rate no more than one such session (House of Commons Hansard, 1 November 2006: col. 308).
In practice no bill which has started in the Lords has held even this single evidence session.27
Section 3: What Value is Added by the New Public Bill Committee
Process?
It is logical to assess any success of, or value added by, these reforms against the original
objectives set out by the Modernisation Committee. As explained in Section 1 above, The
Legislative Process did not include an explicit statement of the aims of the reform proposals for the
committee stage of legislation. These are, however, to be found scattered throughout the report
and were summarised in Figure 1. The first objective – to make clause-by-clause scrutiny of bills
more effective – can be considered a general aim of instigating changes to the legislative
committee system. Whether or not the reforms were successful in achieving this aim is a question
to be considered in the conclusion to this report.
This section assesses the other four broad aims of the reforms: the amount of information
available to MPs, access to the committee stage for outside stakeholders (as well as questions of
transparency), the impact of introducing a more collaborative, evidence-based process, and
greater flexibility with regards to the committee timetable. It identifies areas in which value has
been added by the changes. Section 4 below will then discuss the problems with the new
committee stage, and suggest some improvements.
More information
In The Legislative Process, the Modernisation Committee sought changes to improve the amount,
quality and accessibility of information available at the committee stage (2006a: summary). The
report envisaged that the introduction of evidence-taking sessions would ‘first and foremost
[provide] a mechanism for ensuring that Members are informed about the subject of the bill’ (ibid:
para 53). The Modernisation Committee also advised changes to the format of committee papers
to make these more user-friendly; that additional, clearly worded explanatory documents be
produced; and that as many documents as possible be computerised for ease of access (ibid: para
75).
The appearance of expert witnesses before PBCs, and to a lesser extent their submissions of
informed and concise written evidence, have significantly enhanced both the quality and quantity
of information available to committee members. This is a view which was supported, for example,
by Liberal Democrat MP Andrew Stunell, who sat on the first PBC to have both written and oral
evidence-gathering powers at its disposal. He commented, ‘It is clearly sensible that we have
access to expert and practitioner advice on…key elements of the bill’
14. Roger Gale MP
(Conservative), a member of the Chairmen’s Panel who has presided over a number of public bill
committees, developed this view of the informational advantage resulting from the reforms to the
committee stage. When interviewed he described evidence-taking as ‘a worthwhile exercise’
because ‘it added to the information that the opposition was able to use against the government
and that the government was able to use in support of its legislation.’
The pre-reform standing committees were not bereft of access to information about the bills they
were charged to examine. As Anne Pinney, Assistant Director of Policy and Research at
Barnado’s, explained, producing a written briefing for MPs setting out the organisation’s position
on the bill was something that she would have done anyway. Being asked to appear as a witness
on the Education and Skills Bill was in one sense just another opportunity to put Barnado’s
message across. But she explained that oral evidence gave her a chance to expand on her points
in a way that enabled more information to be presented to the committee than by a written
14 Local Government & Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee, 30 January 2007: col. 7.28
submission alone. Another PBC witness, Janet Allbeson, Policy Advisor at One Parent
Families/Gingerbread, expanded on the particular impact oral evidence was likely to have on the
information available to MPs: ‘…with the oral evidence you have the advantage of the give and
take and the ability to listen to others and formulate your ideas. It is a much more well-rounded
procedure.’
It is clear that there is a particular benefit in terms of the information gained from oral evidence.
While in his previous role
15 as a PBC chair, John Bercow MP (Conservative) told me, ‘there’s all
the difference in the world between written submissions and putting somebody on the spot…It’s
far more valuable. It’s a rich tapestry of quotable material and relevant matter.’ Neil Carberry,
head of Pensions and Employment Policy at the CBI, was adamant that he was able to provide
far more detailed and higher quality evidence by appearing as a witness to the Pensions Bill
Committee than he would have been able to with a traditional written parliamentary briefing.
There seems also to be a psychological impact that results from members being able to question
witnesses face-to-face. Several contributors to this investigation supported the view that engaging
in questioning was likely to leave one more informed about and alert to the terms of a bill than
leafing through a pile of briefing papers. Nick Gibb MP, who led for the Conservatives on the
Education and Skills Bill, was one who was unequivocal about this particular benefit: ‘It is one
thing to read a dry brief…but seeing somebody give evidence, deliver their case, will inevitably
have a bigger impact on your brain, on your understanding of an issue…one knows that from
one’s life generally.’
John Healey MP, Minister of State for Communities and Local Government, saw evidence-taking
as enabling everyone, especially those less informed, ‘to find a way into [the scrutiny of] the bill.’
For those PBC members hard pressed for time to digest briefings on bills received from lobby
organisations, oral evidence sessions are a valuable source of information. This was particularly
apparent to backbench members of PBCs. Phil Wilson MP (Labour) spoke about his experience
as a backbencher on four PBCs – the Criminal Justice & Immigration Bill, Banking Bill, Counter-
Terrorism Bill, and Education & Skills Bill. ‘For me, being a new MP, it is a positive experience
because you learn more… [E]vidence-taking at the beginning can help add a bit more depth for
backbench MPs who are perhaps not thoroughly engaged with it all.’ Unless a member is
particularly interested in the field, ‘backbenchers just don’t have the time or the research power.’
Sir Peter Soulsby MP, a Labour backbencher who has experienced evidence-taking on the Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill, agreed that the role of backbenchers had
been strengthened, ‘It’s much easier to enter into the argument if you’ve also heard the evidence.’
Sir Peter felt he better understood the purpose and the impact of the bills he examined as a result
of hearing expert evidence.
As well as identifying the content of a government bill, the innovation of evidence-taking at
committee stage has provided information to members on what might be missing from a bill.
This was thought to have been the case with the Energy Bill, and points were raised to this effect
by Liberal Democrat and Conservative spokespersons.
16 The exchanges between committee
members who can now directly ask questions of the witnesses, and especially of the minister and
officials, instead of tagging queries to amendments, have provided a more natural and fruitful
method of information gathering. In committees covering more adversarial bills, members do
sometimes use witnesses as conduits for arguments with other parties, not so much seeking
information as confirmation of their views. In general, however, committees have become more
functional, with points made more crisply.
15 John Bercow was elected as the Speaker of the House of Commons on 22 June 2009. Where mentioned in this
report he will be referred to as a member of the Chairmen’s Panel as it was in this capacity that he was interviewed.
16 See Energy Bill Committee, 21 February 2008: col. 28.29
The terms of the reforms place no requirement on a public bill committee to hear evidence from
anyone other than the relevant minister and officials (Modernisation Committee 2006a: para 71).
Not all those interviewed, including one minister, saw the value in requiring the minister to give
evidence. Some, such as John Healey MP, disagreed. Giving evidence meant he was more
informed for the later stages of the bill: ‘for me as the minister managing the bill, it was extremely
useful because it made it clear where the greatest elements of concern and controversy were
before we got into the scrutiny.’ It is clearly advantageous to be able to engage in a direct dialogue
on elements of the bill. It is a practical way for all sides to gain a clear idea of the government’s
thinking.
One way of ensuring that evidence-taking maximises the amount of additional information made
available to the committee is by inviting as wide a range of witnesses as possible. While there
were concerns that whip control over the PBC process would lead to few witnesses being called,
analysis of the statistics in Section 2 indicates that this was far from the case. However, the
quantity of witness submissions will not necessarily directly reflect the amount of information
available to MPs at the committee stage. Some PBCs did succeed in inviting a wide spread of
witnesses. The Minister in charge of the Housing and Regeneration Bill, Iain Wright MP,
commented, ‘We have a good and diverse range of witnesses…a good balance…the committee
will be able to hear and probe different views and perspectives on housing, regulation and
regeneration.’
17 Other individuals interviewed developed the notion of ensuring the witnesses
were chosen carefully. Liberal Democrat MP David Heath spoke of his success in adding the
Advocate General for Scotland to the witness list for the Counter-Terrorism Bill. He explained
that not being a member for a Scottish constituency, and having no one else on the committee
who was either a Scottish minister or representative of the Scotland Office, left all committee
members speaking from a position of ignorance with regards to the impact of the bill on
Scotland. David Heath thought ‘having the Advocate General expressing her view directly and
candidly was enormously useful.’ He admitted, ‘it changed my position on that part of the bill.’
(For more on witness selection and the potential problems involved, see Section 4 below.)
It is clear that value has also been added due to resource innovations contained in the 2006
reforms. The introduction of ‘legislation gateways’ provided by the House of Commons Library
on the parliamentary intranet has brought together all the papers a committee member is likely to
need to access during PBC proceedings. As identified in The Legislative Process, a participant in a
PBC typically needs to refer to the bill, the explanatory notes, the amendment paper, and the
chair’s provisional selection of amendments for that sitting (Modernisation Committee 2006a:
para 75). Additional resources including bill papers from the House of Commons Library,
briefing notes from outside organisations, and other background material may also prove useful
in facilitating the member’s scrutiny of the bill. All are now accessible in the same location.
Explanatory statements – plain English notes clarifying the meaning and intention of
amendments – are an innovation proposed by the 2006 reforms which have so far only occurred
as trials in selected committees. While in principle explanatory statements seem capable of adding
to the information available to members sitting on these committees, they have only been
sporadically embraced by government departments and opposition members. As suggested below,
they need to be made compulsory.
Openness and access
The Modernisation Committee had envisaged evidence-taking public bill committees as a way to
bring greater openness to the legislative process. It was thought that witness sessions and the
17 Housing & Regeneration Bill Committee, 11 December 2007: col. 3.30
submission of written evidence could both enhance the transparency of the committee stage by
bringing much of the briefing and consultation by outside interests onto the public record, and
secondly increase access to, and engagement in, the law making process for those organisations
and individuals. During its own evidence sessions in advance of publishing The Legislative Process,
the Modernisation Committee had learnt that pressure groups would welcome an additional
opportunity to contribute, even if they had been involved in any pre-legislative consultation
conducted by the government (2006a: para 54).
The reforms to the committee stage have unequivocally made the process more transparent.
Openness, in this sense, is considered valuable in itself, and politicians and officials alike
welcomed this effect of the changes. Justice Minister Michael Wills MP thought that ‘more
transparency must be a good thing.’ One clerk commented that the reformed situation ‘must be
better because it brings out into the open a practice which was clearly taking place covertly.’
Another clerk explained that with the old standing committee process, lots of people would be
briefing the committee members, but sometimes only some of them, and all below the radar. He
commented, ‘There was this hidden agenda going on beneath the surface, and I think it’s very
good that that has come out into the public domain, and things are clearly on the record.’
(Despite this advance it must be acknowledged that informal lobbying continues.) All public bill
committee proceedings are recorded in Hansard, the official report. Transcripts of committee
sessions appear on the Hansard pages of the parliamentary website within a few days of sitting.
All written submissions accepted by the chair of a PBC are similarly printed in full and accessible
via this website. PBC sessions are recorded, some in video and some just in audio, and these too
are accessible in real time and on the website’s audio archive.
The Conservative Party’s immigration spokesman, Damian Green MP, explained how openness
in terms of transparency could garner additional benefits in terms of capturing the interest and
trust of the public in parliament and the legislative process. ‘Committee stages of bills usually
pass by and very rarely impact on anyone, and I think having a committee take
evidence…engaged the committee with the outside world and the outside world with the
committee.’ His comments align well with the reputation benefits of making the committee stage
more transparent which the Modernisation Committee hoped would result from their suggested
reforms. Consultation with outside stakeholders is placed on the public record.
Aiming for an open legislative process also entails ensuring that the public and organised interests
have the opportunity to become actively involved in law making. The Modernisation Committee
opened its report by calling for the House of Commons to ‘revise its procedures so that it is
easier for the general public, as well as lobby groups, representative organisations and other
stakeholders to influence parliament’s consideration of bills’ (2006a: summary). The committee
saw this not only as a democratically sound method of approach to the legislative process, but
also a prudent strategy likely to be able to point out defects in proposed legislation (ibid: 2).
Compared to the old standing committee system where there was no forum for official contact
with outside stakeholders, the reformed PBCs have opened up the legislative process to
participation by these groups and individuals. In the opinion of parliamentary officials the
reforms to standing committees have increased stakeholder access to the legislative process. Table
2 shows that in the two parliamentary sessions under investigation, there were a total of 299
witness appearances before PBCs. Discounting ministers and civil servants, as well as repeat
witness appearances, 219 individuals were heard from. Broken down by organisation, 129
separate bodies represented their views. This is from a population of 16 committees which were
able to call witnesses. These figures clearly show the value added to the committee stage as a
result of the reforms – many organisations are given an official platform from which they can
seek to inform and to influence parliament’s consideration of legislation. If one considers that the31
old standing committee stage was described by representatives from the TUC and CBI, two of
the most experienced and well-resourced lobby organisations, as ‘not always…easy to influence’
(Modernisation Committee 2006a: para 55), one can conclude that reformed PBCs have opened
up the legislative process to more widespread participation.
But not all organisations enjoy the privilege of increased access to the legislative process. The
Hansard Society has argued that it is easy to predict who will be invited; that witnesses are likely
to be the ‘usual suspects’ (2008: 223). Liberal Democrat MP David Heath agreed. From his
experience of two PBCs, he noticed little change in the accessibility of the committee stage to
outside interests following the reforms under investigation. David Heath said, ‘It was simply the
obvious candidates for giving evidence, rehearsing their views, which they would have done
before in written briefs or direct lobbying anyway.’ Conservative Education spokesman Nick
Gibb MP suggested similar scepticism about the impact of these reforms on access to the
legislative process. From the perspective of the front bench, at least, ‘you can’t do the job
without talking to the key bodies that are affected…so that happened under the old system.’
Anne Pinney of Barnado’s who herself appeared as a witness to the Education and Skills Bill was
adamant that the PBC process is in fact ‘quite closed.’ She explained: ‘Your name has to be put
forward [to give evidence], so you already have to have been building up contacts and briefing
people and have made clear that you want to be appearing before the committee.’ She referred to
one fellow organisation which she thought had valuable things to contribute, but they had not
been lobbying as hard as Barnado’s. ‘They didn’t know to put their name forward’, Pinney
explained, and so they were not called. ‘That can easily happen to anyone. You have to
push…contacts matter hugely. So in that way I don’t think the system is that transparent and
open.’ At the other end of the scale, Neil Carberry of the CBI believed there was an expectation
on the part of his organisation and the government that the CBI would be involved when it came
to the committee stage. Knowing when to submit written evidence was also considered unclear
by some interviewees (see discussion of this in Section 4).
All of those interviewed who represented outside stakeholders made clear that while a chance to
appear in an oral evidence session was greatly welcomed, the real work was in persuading
committee members to adopt an organisation’s amendments. This involved the same level of
unofficial briefing and lobbying that the old standing committee system had relied on. Both the
representatives from Barnado’s and Gingerbread told of additional events and meetings they had
held with MPs and peers in an attempt to influence parliament’s consideration of legislation.
However, the CBI thought that by giving evidence they had been able to build links with MPs who,
in being able to put names to faces, were more at ease to call representatives of the CBI at
subsequent stages of the bill to raise questions and discuss what had been said in committee. It
appears that while there have been positive steps towards opening up the committee stage to the
participation of outside groups, informal action by these bodies continues below the surface. This
means that, as PBC chair Roger Gale MP observed, ‘The fact that someone doesn’t get invited in
doesn’t mean they don’t get heard.’
Members’ engagement
One aim of the Modernisation Committee was to introduce a more collaborative approach to the
legislative process prompted by the members’ shared participation in the evidence-gathering stage
of the public bill committee (Modernisation Committee 2006a: para 51). It was hoped that this
change to the committee stage would address the sterile nature of the old system, which had
negatively affected members’ engagement. Lengthy, adversarial debate on the minutiae of the
clauses and schedules of bills had succeeded in making standing committee membership one of32
the least engaging and enjoyable duties of MPs. Reformers hoped that beginning the committee
stage with evidence-taking, which from select committee experience was seen to be a more
consensual and collective activity (ibid: para 53), would help ignite the interests of the members
chosen to sit on PBCs.
To a large extent, the reforms were successful in this aim. Damian Green MP described evidence-
taking as ‘significantly the most interesting part of the committee stage.’ Asked whether he
thought evidence-taking provided an incentive for committee members to engage in the
procedure of the PBC, he acknowledged that the reforms had ‘raised the tone and the level of
activity on the bill.’ Sir Peter Soulsby MP reported hearing members of all parties speak positively
about the chance to hear evidence. Phil Wilson MP admitted that for backbenchers, who he said
would not ordinarily be quite so engaged, evidence-taking was a bonus. Wilson noted that it was
‘useful and easier talking about the issues than sifting through all the documents you get from
outside stakeholders.’
It was not just the collective activity of evidence-gathering that sparked the engagement of
members. With more information at their disposal, the members of PBCs felt that they better
understood what was being discussed in committee, and so paid more attention as a result. Janet
Allbeson of Gingerbread felt evidence-taking meant the MPs had to engage more. ‘I think it does
ingrain in them a greater responsibility for what the task [at hand] is’, she said. At a more cynical
level, one parliamentary official observed that engagement was bound to increase with evidence-
taking because in a committee of 17 members, if all the questioning is done by three or four
members of the opposition, lack of involvement on the part of the other committee members is
more exposed. If nothing else, members would be shamed into becoming more engaged with
their duties of scrutiny.
While this report argues that the 2006 reforms have been a success in terms of members’
engagement, this was not always the case, especially in the early PBCs. The lack of engagement
on the part of the Labour members of the UK Borders Bill Committee had registered with its
chair, Eric Illsley MP (Labour). He recalled how in the first evidence session ‘the government
side didn’t ask a question.’ Another committee chair pointed to the burden placed on the Scrutiny
Unit to suggest lines of questioning because the members did not want to engage sufficiently
with the process to do their own work on the bill. Both chairs were referring to experience on
committees that were amongst the first to use the new powers. It is possible that on these
committees, members new to the process were still stuck to the old way of doing the committee
stage – keeping quiet and letting the front bench spokespeople lead proceedings. There is the
hope that with time, members’ engagement will increase further.
Although members engage more than on the old standing committees, engagement has not
developed to the extent found in select committees. Because membership is not permanent,
members of PBCs do not develop a close working relationship nor act with the same camaraderie
displayed by select committees. Moreover, the more modest aspiration that beginning PBCs with
a method of scrutiny based on consensus would inform the mood of the later line-by-line
scrutiny of the bill does not seem to have occurred in practice either. Roger Gale MP revealed
that he ‘had hoped it was going to, but I got the feeling it didn’t.’
One resource innovation which has the potential to enhance the engagement of members of
PBCs is the introduction of legislation gateways. These ought to save MPs time, aid their
understanding of the bill and increase accessibility to it, thus breaking down some of the
traditional barriers to members’ full engagement with the committee stage. Members are said to
like the resource, but it is hard to tell how much it is used. The legislation gateways should also33
benefit the public’s understanding of the legislative process, as well as make the business of law
making more accessible.
Improved debate
Another positive consequence of the reforms is that with enhanced availability of information
and greater member engagement, the quality of debate in committee has improved. As the
Modernisation Committee intended, the approach to the committee stage is now more evidence-
based. The introduction of evidence sessions, which allow questions to be posed directly to
witnesses, has produced a more fruitful process. In particular, the ability of members to ask
questions of the minister, who for one session sits before the committee as a witness, has added
value. Gone is the need to peg questions to so-called ‘probing’ amendments, which before the
reform afforded the only means available to air such queries. (While the need to use these
amendments has been removed, they are still occasionally tabled by members.)
The improved debate has continued into the clause-by-clause phase of the process. Damian
Green MP reflected on the committee sessions attended by witnesses during consideration of the
UK Borders Bill: ‘…it is an extremely good innovation, for which I am happy to commend the
Leader of the House. Some of my remarks on…amendments arise from the evidence we heard.
It would be extremely useful to show that taking expert witness evidence helps us to have better
debates during the scrutiny stage of the bill.’
18 He proceeded to mention the evidence given by
Liberty and a barrister from the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association.
Andrew Selous MP (Conservative) made similar remarks as the Child Maintenance and Other
Payments Bill moved from evidence-taking sessions to detailed scrutiny. He commented, ‘I
believe that we obtained some very useful evidence from our witnesses, some of which I shall
refer to during our deliberations today.’
19 Labour backbencher Sir Peter Soulsby MP was another
who noted the impact of hearing evidence: ‘…right from the very start it was interesting the
extent to which in the debate on subsequent clauses members referred back to “As so and so told
us” etc.’ Greater interest has spawned greater engagement and led to improved debate.
Whether improved debate leads to different or better legislation is harder to assess. One view is
that the effectiveness of these reforms can only be judged by measuring the extent to which
information from witnesses is fed into discussion in later stages of a bill. But the impact of
legislative reform is not easily quantifiable, and there can be less tangible effects that indicate
success. This issue was discussed with John Bercow MP, who chaired the Counter-Terrorism Bill
and Education and Skills Bill. He suggested that evidence-taking ‘doesn’t necessarily change the
outcome but it can make the discussion more meaningful.’ How one judges the success of the
PBC reforms is discussed further in the Conclusion to this report.
Flexibility
The final aim of the reforms was to make the committee stage more flexible, part of a wider aim
to introduce a more flexible approach generally to the timetabling of bills.
Compared to the special standing committee procedure on which the PBCs were based, the
reformed committee stage is more flexible. PBCs have not followed the procedure of SSCs,
18 UK Borders Bill Committee, 6 March 2007: col. 137.
19 Child Maintenance & Other Payments Bill Committee, 19 July 2007: col. 87.34
which were limited to just three public evidence-gathering sessions. In the period under
investigation, with the exception of the simplest bills which sped through committee, the majority
of PBCs held four complete sittings with witnesses.
But there are strict limits to this flexibility. Whip presence and a government majority combine to
make the programming sub-committee resistant to changes, which they fear might affect control
over the timetabling of the committee. There have only been occasional successes in adding
witnesses to the evidence-taking programme through successful amendments to the programme
motion as decided by the programming sub-committee. For example, the Criminal Justice and
Immigration Bill Committee succeeded in adding the Evangelical Alliance to the witness list
during debate on the programme motion.
20 While such examples are good in terms of outcome, it
is noted that demanding a new witness with only two days’ notice can be highly disruptive in
terms of practicality. Amendments sought to the programme motion for the UK Borders Bill so
as to enable Migration Watch to appear a week later than the whips desired is a notable example
of the inflexibility of PBCs as well as of the persistence of party political spats at committee
stage.
21
All PBCs began with evidence-taking and progressed to detailed scrutiny. There is nothing in the
rules governing the committee stage, however, to prevent a PBC from returning to evidence-
taking once clause-by-clause analysis has started. That just one committee (on the UK Borders
Bill) has yet used this capacity perhaps suggests some residual inflexibility in the committee
process. The flexibility of a PBC to divide its time between evidence and scrutiny sessions is to be
welcomed, however. Different balances will be appropriate to different bills, and a system which
allows this to be decided on a bill-by-bill basis is ideal. Furthermore, the Modernisation
Committee should be praised for deciding to retain the traditional clause-by-clause scrutiny
sessions instead of basing all scrutiny on evidence-taking. Putting the government on the spot by
debate on clauses and amendments is an effective way of making ministers justify their bills.
While it is possible to identify changes which have added value to the committee stage in terms
of greater flexibility, the government’s rejection of the Modernisation Committee’s
recommendations regarding programming has left some of the restrictions on the timing and
number of committee sessions in place (contrary to the aims of The Legislative Process, see
Modernisation Committee 2006a: paras 46, 71). That a single programme motion, which defines
the date by which a bill must leave PBC immediately, continues to be moved at the end of second
reading sets restrictions on what the committee can achieve. It may be able to define its timetable
and the division of sittings between evidence-gathering and line-by-line scrutiny, but it still has an
inflexible amount of time at its disposal. Injecting further flexibility into the committee stage of
the legislative process would require a willingness to address these issues surrounding
programming and timetabling of legislation. These can be associated with the culture of doing
politics in Westminster (to be raised in the Conclusion).
20 Criminal Justice & Immigration Bill Committee, 16 October 2007: col. 9.
21 See UK Borders Bill Committee, 27 February 2007: cols. 1-11.35
Section 4: How Can the Public Bill Committee Process be Improved?
The public bill committee experience is now into its third parliamentary session. Enhanced
scrutiny was badly needed, and the reforms have received widespread praise. Assessed against the
aims of the Modernisation Committee, the committee stage has become more informed,
engaging and transparent. Evidence sessions with expert witnesses have provided material to
support the process of scrutiny and have the potential to introduce a more consensual approach
to what was previously a highly politicised process. However, very few interviewees were without
some criticism of the new committee procedure. While the broad principle of the reform has
been welcomed, calls have been made for further modifications. These calls take two forms:
those which fall within the terms of The Legislative Process; and those that seek to overcome
weaknesses which persist despite the changes made, forming part of wider-reaching aspirations
for reform of legislative scrutiny.
The problems with PBCs are examined below, starting with the two most fundamental areas of
weakness – the timing of these committees, and the decisions about witnesses. For each problem,
suggested improvements are offered. These appear in bold type, and are summarised in the
Recommendations section at the end of this report.
Timing
As discussed in Section 3 above, the reforms to the committee stage have in some respects
injected more flexibility into this part of the legislative process. PBCs are free to set their own
timetable, dividing time available between evidence and scrutiny sessions as they see fit. As a
result, when compared to special standing committees on which PBCs were modelled, the new
committees are blessed with significantly greater autonomy over the timetabling of their
proceedings. Compared to regular standing committees, however, the PBC reforms have made
no obvious impact on the timing of the committee stage and have even added to pressure on
time with the need now to accommodate evidence and scrutiny sessions. Residual inflexibility and
other issues surrounding the timing of PBCs continue to cause problems for the effectiveness of
scrutiny at this part of the legislative process. Problems raised by the timing of PBCs are
fundamental to many aspects of the other concerns with the new process.
In some areas, the 2006 reforms have failed to address timing problems which already existed
with the old standing committee system. But additional concerns about timing have also been
created as a direct result of adopting the new committee procedure. The continued practice of
setting a bill’s out-date from committee in the motions moved at the end of second reading
places a straitjacket around the committee’s timetable. It means that from the moment a bill
enters a PBC, one eye must be kept firmly on the clock. This nervousness about time is in part a
result of the government’s rejection of the Modernisation Committee’s recommendation to split
the programme motion in two – one declaring that the bill is to be programmed, the other setting
an out-date and moved a few days later, allowing time to reflect on any impact of what was said
at second reading. Because of the notice required to be given before a programme motion is
tabled, its details, including the out-date, must in fact be settled in advance of the second reading
debate. This arrangement was far from ideal in the pre-reform days of standing committees. The
consequence of too short a time in committee meant that some bills were not adequately
scrutinised. While the introduction of programming in 1997 made it more likely that all clauses of
a bill would receive attention, the tendency remained to place most consideration on the early
clauses and rush through the later ones. That the same timing structure was maintained for public
bill committees is a significant problem. This fault is not with the contents of the Modernisation
Committee’s report, but with the way in which it was accepted.36
The problems with the timetabling of the committee stage are part of wider issues concerning
timing in parliament. It is, as one clerk commented, ‘a problem which haunts everything we do.’
The perennial conflict between parliament’s need to scrutinise legislation, and the government’s
need to get its legislation through feeds tensions over the time available for a legislative process
that, even with carry-over of bills, is not infinite. The timetabling straitjacket placed on bills is a
symptom of this conflict. A timetable which was fairly unsuited to the old committee stage is,
with public bill committees, now under added strain. Starting the committee stage with evidence-
gathering, while maintaining the standing committee timetable, has led to four pressure points in
terms of timing:
 There is insufficient time for officials, witnesses and members to prepare for the
committee stage.
 The balance between evidence-taking and detailed scrutiny is under strain, prompting
concern that there is not enough time to do both well.
 Members are not given the time to reflect on what has been learnt during the witness
sessions.
 In some cases there is not sufficient time available to give the required notice for
informed amendments.
The first of these concerns – the pressure that everyone involved is placed under to prepare for
committee – was raised by all those interviewed for this inquiry and was aired in the very first
committee to hear from outside witnesses under the changed Standing Orders. The Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill had received its second reading on a Monday.
The committee membership was decided on the Wednesday, and the programming sub-
committee met on the Thursday. At this meeting it was agreed that the first committee session to
hear evidence would be the following Tuesday. In the days immediately prior to the meeting of
the programming sub-committee, consultation among the usual channels had resulted in a list of
witnesses being given to the Scrutiny Unit to check the availability of witnesses, with the aim of
agreeing a programme at the programming sub-committee. This timetable, which was similar to
that followed by many PBCs, left the Scrutiny Unit little time to contact those the programming
sub-committee wished to give evidence. The Scrutiny Unit must track down the witnesses, make
sure they are who the programming sub-committee think they are (there has been a case of a mis-
identified local councillor), ensure they have the correct job titles, and see if they can attend often
less than a week later. If members seek to change the programme at the first official meeting of
the PBC (which they are allowed to do), this can cause even more stress for both the Scrutiny
Unit and the witnesses, who may well have had to devote significant effort to reorganising their
schedules to be there in the first place.
The pressure on time worried Conservative MP Alistair Burt: ‘In order for there to be sensible
consideration of who ought to give evidence and to give witnesses time to rearrange their diaries
accordingly, a certain amount of time is necessary. We are concerned that that has not been
given.’
22 From the potential witnesses’ points of view the timing of committees has been
problematic. It is not just that witnesses need to have time in their diaries to appear, but they also
need time to prepare. In interviews, Neil Carberry of the CBI spoke of the need to produce a
written submission and prepare for oral evidence ‘in a bit of a rush.’ Anne Pinney of Barnardo’s
explained that her organisation had declined to give expert evidence to a recent bill having only
been told two days before they were scheduled to appear. ‘The timescale was impossible’, she
said. Time constraints were blamed for the concerns of some interviewees about who the
witnesses were (a problem expanded on in the following sub-section). One chair thought that the
quality of evidence was damaged by the rushed process of deciding who to call as a witness. ‘[I]f
22 Local Government & Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee, 30 January 2007: col. 4.37
there isn’t sufficient time for people to be invited to come along to give evidence…the quality of
the evidence-giving is less likely to be incisive.’ Eric Illsley MP, another member of the
Chairmen’s Panel, said, ‘Because you’re doing this in a condensed time scale…sometimes you can
bring a witness who is probably going to be inappropriate.’ It can happen that a witness
suggested by the programming sub-committee, when contacted, feels they have little to
contribute, or even that they are unaware of the bill.
To provide effective scrutiny, members of public bill committees must also be given enough time
to prepare. The hasty progress to committee from the end of second reading, and the rush to
begin evidence-gathering straight away means that members have no initial private committee
session to meet as a committee and discuss witnesses and approaches to questioning. The
absence of this private meeting is in contrast to the practice of special standing committees. This,
argued one official, had not been the intention of the Modernisation Committee. The lack of
time for a planning meeting crucially excludes most members from involvement in deciding who
to call to give evidence (the substantial problems arising from this will be discussed below). The
current arrangements for the start of the committee stage do not encourage members to be
prepared. There is no chance to foster a collective approach to the questioning of witnesses,
which, from select committee experience, would likely make these sessions more fruitful.
Logistically it can be hard for members (and chairs) of committees to absorb all the written
material they receive from witnesses and from the Scrutiny Unit and Commons Library. Some
members spoke of being ‘overwhelmed’ by the large numbers of pieces of paper arriving at short
notice.
23 The speed with which some bills enter committee even prevents some members from
attending the initial meetings, a problem carried over from the old system that needs to be
addressed.
All involved in the new committee system would benefit from a longer lead-in time to facilitate
the preparatory work required. This improvement was overlooked by The Legislative Process. It is
recommended that the programme motion moved at the end of second reading should
acknowledge this need to prepare for PBCs by including a gap of at minimum two weeks
between the end of second reading and the first evidence-taking session. But this should
not be achieved by shaving two weeks off the time available for the committee stage – whether
evidence-taking or line-by-line scrutiny time. The two week gap to enable the Scrutiny Unit to
organise the evidence sessions, the witnesses to find time to be able to appear and to be prepared,
and the members to inform themselves about the bill, should be extra time. A pause before the
committee stage had been advised by Sir Alan Haselhurst, the deputy Speaker of the House of
Commons, in a memo on the new process referred to during the first PBC.
24
The second pressure point about timing is a symptom of the programming straitjacket described
above. The introduction of evidence sessions, it was argued (Modernisation Committee 2006a:
para 69), would not necessarily extend the committee stage, and in fact had the potential to
decrease the amount of time needed for scrutinising debate. However, this investigation found
that tension exits over the balance between the two phases of PBCs. With some interviewees
favouring more evidence-taking and others keen to ensure sufficient energy was devoted to
traditional scrutiny, the lack of elasticity in the committee timetable is still an issue.
25
What then can be done about this? One option is to adopt the Modernisation Committee’s
original advice of moving two programme motions. This would remove the current absurdity of
23 Alun Michael, Planning Bill Committee, 8 January 2008: cols. 1-2.
24 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee, 30 January 2007: col. 6.
25 See a comparison of the debates in committee on the programme motions for the Pensions Bill and Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill for illustration (15 January 2008: col. 4, and 30 January 2007: col.
4 respectively).38
deciding on how much time will be needed for the PBC before the principles of the bill have
even been debated at second reading. Moving a second programme motion informed by
discussion on the themes of the bill could lead to a more suitable timetable, for example with
regards to sharing time between evidence and scrutiny, and knowing which witnesses associated
with more contentious elements of the bill may perhaps require more time to offer and be
quizzed on their views. However, this would imply a reliance on the detail of second reading
debate, which some interviewees thought unrealistic. Front bench spokespeople asserted that the
parties are likely to have an idea of who they might wish to invite as witnesses long before second
reading; for those leading on a bill it is necessary to be sufficiently prepared and engaged. Yet
even if it were decided that following the Modernisation Committee’s recommendations on the
programme motion would constitute an improvement to the PBC process, the committee stage
would still acquire a bounded timetable, just one decided upon a few days later than current
practice. This is a natural result of the demands on parliamentary time, of the ever-present
conflict between parliament’s duty to scrutinise government bills, and a government’s wish to get
its legislative business passed. Addressing this requires wholesale reform prompted by a radical
change in the culture of parliamentary politics in Britain.
The third problem to arise due to the timing of PBCs is that the speed with which bills progress
from evidence-taking to scrutiny within the committee stage does not allow members time to
reflect on what has been learnt during the witness sessions. This third pressure point is associated
with the fourth – the need for sufficient time to table amendments. In order to make
evidence-taking worthwhile, time needs to be put aside for members to absorb the
information received. The Modernisation Committee failed to suggest such an arrangement.
The call for a period of reflection was mentioned in several interviews, and has been raised
repeatedly during committee proceedings. For example, Andrew Tyrie MP (Conservative) stated,
‘It strikes me that the crucial issue, if we are to make sense of the evidence sitting, is to be given
enough time to think through [what we have learnt]’
26. In informing committee members about
the bill, part of the purpose of evidence-taking is to facilitate and (it is hoped) enhance the line-
by-line scrutiny stage. In taking time to reflect on what has been learnt from witnesses, members
must also reflect, “Now that I have learnt things I didn’t know at the start of the operation, how
does that affect my view on the bill and the amendments I want to put down?”
Under the terms of the reforms accepted by the House of Commons, the notice period for
amendments tabled during the committee stage was extended from two to three days. It was
intended that this would allow government and opposition members alike more time to reflect on
the implications of amendments before they were debated (Modernisation Committee 2006a:
para 79). This was a sensible change but, combined with the speed of the committee timetable,
has resulted in procedures which are in clear need of further reform.
The tight timetabling of many PBCs has meant that members are unable to table amendments
informed by the evidence received in time for the first line-by-line scrutiny session. An official on
the Banking Bill Committee explained: ‘The first evidence session was on the Tuesday, the first
traditional scrutiny of clauses was on the Thursday. The cut off for the tabling of amendments to
be raised on the Thursday was the rise of the House on the Monday. Therefore nothing said on
Tuesday could influence any amendment debated on Thursday because the text would have
already had to be handed in.’ David Heath MP described his experience of this effect of the
compressed timetable as ‘a clear flaw in the procedure.’ Many other bills suffered in this way
from tight timetabling. In the 2007-08 session, the Health and Social Care Bill began its line-by-
line scrutiny the afternoon of the same day it heard from its final witness. Because there were
only two committee sittings of the National Insurance Contributions Bill and Sale of Student
26 Political Parties & Elections Bill Committee, 4 November 2008: col. 3. See also Edward Garnier in the Criminal
Justice & Immigration Bill Committee, 16 October 2007: col. 8.39
Loans Bill, and one for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (Supplementary) Bill, the committee
members were given no time at all to reflect on witnesses’ statements and weave these into
amendments and debate.
In the interests of reflecting on what is learnt through evidence-taking, and fully realising the
influence expert evidence can have on amending (with the intention of improving) legislation,
there should be a full week’s gap between the final witness appearance and the start of
line-by-line scrutiny. If the last evidence sitting is on Thursday afternoon, the committee
should not reconvene until at least the following Thursday. Once again, this extra week should be
new time.
Adding three weeks to the committee stage of the legislative process is unlikely to be welcomed
by all. The achievability of this change will be viewed differently depending on an individual’s role
in the PBC and the wider legislative process. Its acceptance as a method to tackle the problems of
timing will also be linked to the wider question of accepting a culture of scrutiny. In defence of
these proposals this section on timing concludes with the observations of one interviewee on the
inflexibility of the timetabling of the Education and Skills Bill:
I don’t really know why we have to curtail it. There is a big gap after the committee stage,
and there is a huge gap coming back from the Lords. I mean we only looked at the Lords
amendments last week [mid-November], and [the committee sat] in January. And now we
have a change in procedure so you can carry over from one session to the next, so I don’t
see why there has to be any rush in the Commons.
Witnesses and evidence
In addition to the problems associated with the strict timetabling of PBCs, concerns were
repeatedly raised about the witnesses appearing before these committees. While the principle of
evidence-taking has been welcomed as an improvement to the committee stage (see discussion in
previous sections of this report) the problems caused by the organisation of the witness process
are substantial. These fall under two main headings: firstly, who decides who will be invited to
give evidence; and secondly, are the right people heard from?
PBCs suffer from a lack of committee ownership over their proceedings. This is particularly
evident with the issue of witness selection. While recommending that evidence-gathering powers
be granted to PBCs, the Modernisation Committee’s report lacked detail on how this process
would operate. At present the witness list does not emerge in a transparent way. The
responsibility for drawing it up is formally vested in the programming sub-committee, which
consists of the party spokespeople, a government and an opposition whip, and two backbenchers
who are always from the governing party and are usually not entirely free agents (for example, the
PPS to the minister). The sub-committee is dominated by the whips, and the programme motion
they are charged to arrive at is in fact formulated through the bi-lateral mechanisms of the usual
channels. In theory each party’s representatives will present a list of their favoured witnesses and
either everyone’s views will be accommodated or a compromise will be reached. However, the
Cabinet Office’s detailed guide to law making for ministers and civil servants suggests substantial
involvement by the government department in this process (2009). In reality, the officials in the
whips’ office will ask the bill team for suggestions and then draw up a proposed programme to
give to the government whips. Since the whips are not subject specialists, it is perhaps
unsurprising that they to turn to the bill teams for ideas about witness selection. Nonetheless, the
secretive nature of these deliberations, the government’s majority on the sub-committee, and
crucially the exclusion of the other PBC members, has resulted in an unsatisfactory state of40
affairs. Ideally, the whips of all parties will consult, and individually seek the views of their own
party’s committee members. But because this will occur behind closed doors, there is no way of
knowing if it in fact takes place. Witness selection is one area of the reformed process over which
the influence of the usual channels has proved problematic.
Tensions resulting from the opaque nature of these decisions were raised in several PBCs during
the 2006-07 and 2007-08 sessions. While various ministers have spoken in favour of the
programming sub-committee’s ability to deliver a good range of witnesses, backbench and
opposition members have been far from reassured. As David Heath MP explained: ‘When we
take evidence, the committee does not act as a hierarchy but as a select committee. Therefore, it
should be open for all hon. members to suggest who might usefully give evidence.’
27 In the Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee, Labour backbencher Patrick
Hall MP questioned the overrepresentation of local government spokespersons amongst the
committee’s witnesses, especially considering that other committee members had referred to ‘a
huge list of possible witnesses’ who had not been invited.
28 Conservative Edward Garnier MP, in
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill Committee, alleged that suggestions of possible
witnesses had been ignored by the government.
29 Liam Byrne MP, the Minister who led the UK
Borders Bill tried to stress the integrity of the witness selection procedures.
30 The committee’s
chair, however, had a different impression. Eric Illsley MP told me, ‘The government whips really
were not 100 per cent behind the system and you could see that there was some reluctance on
their part to call witnesses who would be antagonistic towards the government’s position.’
In contrast to the PBC procedure, the selection of witnesses by select committees is a
collaborative process. Select committees usually hold a deliberative meeting early in an inquiry to
decide which witnesses to invite, where an initial list prepared by committee staff is considered
and members can propose alternative or additional witnesses to call. If legislative scrutiny
evidence sessions are to be used to maximum benefit, the decision over who PBCs hear from
cannot be in the hands of a government-dominated minority of committee members. Nor can
the process be whip-owned. The Modernisation Committee seem to have assumed that PBCs
would follow the SSC format and hold a private meeting of the whole committee to decide on
witnesses. But their report on The Legislative Process did not state this recommendation explicitly,
and it needs to be made explicit now. An initial, private meeting of all committee members
should be held to decide on the witness list and the committee’s timetable. This planning
session would replace the need for a programming sub-committee. A week after this
planning meeting the whole committee should reconvene to formally agree the
programme motion. In the intervening time the Scrutiny Unit will have made enquiries about
the availability of the desired witnesses. These meetings can be held during the advised two week
gap between second reading and the first evidence-gathering session, still leaving more time than
is currently available to prepare for the committee stage. There would then be no need to
approve the programme motion in the first 30 minutes of the first committee sitting, as currently,
so this period could instead be used solely for discussion and dividing up of questions. This
would mirror practice in select committees, and leave more time for questioning the first
witnesses.
The administration of the witness selection process needs to change so that the authority to
determine the terms of the programme motion (including the list of witnesses) moves from the
executive to parliament. At the staff level, members of the Scrutiny Unit and the committee clerk
from the Public Bill Office should facilitate decisions regarding witnesses and programming
27 Criminal Justice & Immigration Bill Committee, 16 October 2007: col. 7.
28 Local Government & Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee, 30 January 2007: col. 7.
29 Criminal Justice & Immigration Bill Committee, 16 October 2007: col. 5.
30 UK Borders Bill Committee, 27 February 2007: col. 3.41
rather than (as currently) officials in the whips’ office and government department sponsoring
the bill. Formal ownership should then be with the PBC chair. The programme motion should
be tabled in the name of the PBC chair, who should have responsibility for determining
the committee’s programme. Shifting the balance of decision-making power to the chair (and
thus to parliament) would formalise the negotiations over witnesses, ensure consultation with all
committee members who wish to propose a witness, and therefore enhance PBC members’
ownership and engagement with the process.
The second worry with the arrangements for witness appearances before PBCs is whether the
right people are called. Because of the strict timetable of these committees, not everybody can be
heard from. The need to strike a balance makes selecting the correct witnesses even more
important. This begs the question, who are the ‘correct’ witnesses? In its 2004 report Connecting
Parliament with the Public the Modernisation Committee said the legislative process should become
more accessible and understandable, especially to those outside parliament (2004). But there is
doubt about who the targets ‘outside’ parliament were. Were they organised interests or
unaffiliated members of the public? Of the 219 individual witnesses heard from in the sessions
under investigation just one declared himself to be there ‘as an individual.’
31 David Heath MP was
critical of the identity of the witnesses convened for the PBCs he sat on, and he advised that
committees need to be more adventurous in where they gather evidence from. When interviewed
he recommended hearing from the end users, those affected by the new pieces of legislation,
rather than focusing on organised interests. This would help to open up the participation in
evidence-taking sessions. However, identifying and accessing suitable individuals beyond the
‘usual suspects’ would not necessarily be easy.
PBCs lack the capacity of select committees to ask for responses to an ‘Issues and Questions
paper’ as part of the evidence-gathering process. Adopting this mechanism could be one way that
PBCs could attract a wider spread of interested outside parties, and potential witnesses. Because
submitting written evidence may be a more realistic way for members of the public to take part, a
PBC should be encouraged to use their power formally to invite individuals or
organisations to submit written evidence. The PBC currently does not make use of this
power because by the time it first meets it is essentially too late to start appealing for evidence. If
the recommended initial planning meeting is adopted however, the PBC should issue a call for
evidence in a press release immediately after the first planning meeting. Members of the
PBCs should be encouraged to suggest people who might be asked to provide written evidence,
either because they have particular knowledge or expertise or because they can relate experiences
that might have a bearing on the formulation of the proposed piece of legislation. This would
enable the committee to gain a clearer idea of the impact the legislation they are examining will
have on the public. To maximise the potential impact of written evidence it needs to be
received by the PBC in time for its members to consider its contents and apply what is
learnt to their scrutiny of the bill. The need for written evidence to arrive far enough in
advance of line-by-line scrutiny links to the recommendations below about greater publicity.
Several interviewees expressed the view that witness lists were by and large expected: that those
who were asked to give oral representations to PBCs were ‘the usual suspects.’ Anne Pinney of
Barnado’s was one who argued that there is a degree of predictability in who will appear. There is
a danger that the organisations that are not called can feel disenfranchised and demoralised if the
same people appear again and again. But there can be good reason for inviting the ‘usual
suspects’, as these groups and individuals have gained status and recognition as experts in their
fields. Even if the candidates heard from in PBC are obvious, the fact that they are appearing in
person, rather than through written memo alone, enhances the amount and depth of evidence
31 Witness Tom Burke claimed, “I would like to make it very clear that I am here in my own right.” Energy Bill
Committee, 5 February 2008: col. 66.42
they can present and thus enhances the committee process. Other interviewees expressed
confidence that PBCs were hearing from a fair representation of those willing to speak who did
add to the knowledge of the members charged with examining the bill.
There are a couple of interim changes to the administration of the witness selection process that
can be made immediately, even if the programming sub-committee retains control of determining
who will be called to appear before a PBC. Considering PBCs’ lack of staffing support and
inability to develop their own expertise in the bill area due to their ad hoc nature, better links
could be fostered with the select committees who are experienced at choosing appropriate
witnesses to aid scrutiny. Developing a link at the staff level with the clerk of the relevant select
committee would fulfill this recommendation, but this would be a relationship without an
accountability trail (and there is little input by the clerks currently in this process). Instead, the
whips on the programming sub-committee should be encouraged to consult with the
chair of the relevant select committee about witness choices, with the aim of producing a
more informed and valuable witness list. Of course, if the recommendation to replace the
programming sub-committee with a planning meeting of the whole committee is accepted, and if
clerks in the Scrutiny Unit and Public Bill Office are involved in the decision-making processes,
they will be able to make use of their existing strong links with the select committee staff to this
effect.
To provide greater clarity about why specific witnesses are chosen, and to avoid scenarios of
witnesses being put forward on the strength of the minister meeting them at a party (which did
happen in one case), the Scrutiny Unit need to be better briefed than they currently are on why
they are asking particular witnesses to appear. It is important that the Scrutiny Unit are able to
give these reasons to the witnesses themselves. Greater involvement of the Scrutiny Unit in the
decisions taken when formulating the PBC’s witness list will help achieve this. Being a part of
these discussions would benefit the staff at the Scrutiny Unit by providing a clearer idea of why it
is people are being called to give evidence, and what is expected of them. The need to approach
someone from National Car Parks for the UK Borders Bill is an example of a witness choice
which was not clear prima facie.
Membership
A much criticised element of standing committees was that their membership, especially on the
government’s side, tended to be comprised solely of MPs congenial to the minister leading the
bill through committee, and to the party line on that particular policy area (see, for example,
Walkland 1979: 254). Loyal ‘lobby-fodder’, would be favoured for standing committee duty over
members known to take opposing views to those of government – the serial rebels, or even those
regarded as a bit temperamental. Russell and Paun describe these as the ‘unreliable’ members
(2007: 22). Figures from only a few years before the PBC reforms show how unlikely it was for a
Labour rebel at second reading to be selected to sit on the standing committee. For example,
there were 72 rebels at the second reading of the Higher Education Bill 2004, yet just one was
chosen to contribute to the committee stage. The Gambling Bill of the same year had 30 Labour
rebels, none of whom sat on the standing committee (ibid: Appendix C). There was also no firm
requirement to appoint people with a subject interest to standing committees, such as those who
were also members of relevant select committees, or even All Party Parliamentary Groups.
It is surprising that the Modernisation Committee gave no detail about the membership
arrangements for PBCs beyond urging that members who served on pre-legislative committees
be included in the membership of the bill committee at the committee stage (2006a: summary).
The committee would have been aware of the criticisms of the old standing committees. Reform43
projects which preceded The Legislative Process had included membership amongst their targeted
criticism of standing committees (see for example, Hansard Society 1992, 2001; Lords
Constitution Committee, 2004). Indeed, recalling evidence that he gave to the Modernisation
Committee (2006a: Ev.26-33), John Bercow MP said: ‘I remember objecting very strongly…that
the troublemakers are kept away, and these voices should be heard….They are serious people
with serious objections and arguments and they ought to be on bills where they take a dissenting
view.’
32 Yet no proposal to alter the way in which members of these committees are chosen was
suggested as part of the 2006 reform package.
Formal authority to choose members to sit on public bill committees rests, as was the case with
standing committees, with the Committee of Selection. Comprised of nine members, seven of
whom are whips, this Committee has long been criticised as a rubber-stamp for the pre-prepared
lists presented by the party business managers (Russell & Paun 2007: 21). Attempts were
sometimes made to find members with knowledge and interest in the bill subject. Sir Peter
Soulsby MP spoke of his membership of the Local Government and Public Involvement in
Health Bill having been influenced by his many years in charge of Leicester City Council.
Members of the Political Parties and Elections Bill Committee were considered to be
knowledgeable about the issues covered by that piece of legislation. Surprised by the composition
of the Energy Bill Committee, and its associated potential for effectiveness, Charles Hendry MP
(Conservative) commented, ‘it is very encouraging that it is actually a committee full of members
who understand energy, who care passionately about different aspects of it, and that is very
good.’
33 But for all those who were pleasantly surprised by PBC membership, there were many,
including witnesses, who lamented the continued habit of filling committees with loyal voices. A
study of the membership lists of committees shows that the names of specialists and occasional
rebels rarely appear.
Membership of PBCs must reflect the balance of views across the House on the subject
of the bill in question, with additional efforts made to seek members with relevant
interest or expertise. In their report, The House Rules?, Russell and Paun similarly stressed the
importance of ensuring that the composition of bill committees reflects the balance of opinion in
the House rather than simply party balance (2007: 79). The membership of PBCs can be
improved by changing the mechanism by which they are chosen. Suggestions to alter the
composition of the Committee of Selection, and even to replace this with a different body, have
been made by past inquiries into parliamentary reform (see for example the Norton Commission
2000: 29). The Modernisation Committee made its own recommendations to place the selection
of committee members entirely in the hands of backbenchers (2002: paras 15-17). The
recommendation of this investigation that the membership of the Committee of Selection be
altered to include just three whips (one from each of the main parties), with the rest of its
members to be drawn from the backbenches of each of the main parties, follows the
recommendations of Ken Clarke’s Conservative Democracy Taskforce (2007) and Russell and
Paun (2007: 77-78). Under this arrangement, party wishes would still be aired but would not
dominate.
One issue associated with committee membership, which for international commentators would
be an obvious option for further reform, is replacing ad hoc committees with a permanent
legislative committee system. Lessons from select committees, as well as swathes of literature (for
example, Longley & Davidson 1998; Olson 1994; Olson & Mezey 1991; Shaw 1998a, 1998b),
32 While giving evidence to the Modernisation Committee, Bercow did note, “The Higher Education Bill: I think
there were over 70 rebels on the Tuition Fees Bill, something like 73 rebels, at second reading who actually voted
against the Government. Only two opponents of the Bill were on standing committee which consisted, I think, of 20
Members….That seems to me to be wrong” (Modernisation Committee 2006a: Ev 28).
33 Energy Bill Committee, 21 February 2008: col. 128.44
demonstrate the value of permanent membership of committees in developing the knowledge
and expertise of individual members, and thus enhancing their capacity to perform effective
scrutiny. But interviewees did not support a permanent legislative committee system even when
asked to ignore the organisational and resource implications that such a move would incur. This
hints perhaps at the continued parochialism of the House of Commons but also at fears that the
independence and effectiveness of the select committee system would be damaged if these
committees also took on bill scrutiny. This may be true, but it is not the only way of achieving
permanent legislative committees. The suggestion of this investigation is that in the longer term
Westminster moves towards establishing a parallel system of permanent legislation committees to
complement and work alongside the select committees. This development would allow expertise
and knowledge to be accumulated and applied to the vital task of legislative scrutiny, likely
improving the quality of that scrutiny. There would be other benefits as well, such as providing
an alternative career path for backbenchers and introducing independent leadership positions,
which would contribute to strengthening the position of parliament vis-à-vis the executive
(Norton 1998b: 144). Parliament has a large enough supply of backbenchers for permanent bill
committees to become a reality, especially if the number of PPSs and ministers were cut. There
could be some, probably quite minimal, overlap between select committee and legislative
committee membership if numbers required this. Moving to a system of permanent
legislative scrutiny committees, separate from the existing select committee system,
would further strengthen parliament’s powers of scrutiny. Its adoption should be kept
under review.
Resources and Administration
There are a few modest resource improvements which could be applied to PBCs to increase their
effectiveness.
At present the Scrutiny Unit is stretched, juggling its existing duties with respect to select
committees and pre-legislative scrutiny with new responsibilities for the co-ordination of
evidence-gathering by PBCs. The need to invite witnesses and prepare committee members’
questions, coordinate the production of briefing material for the committee with the House of
Commons Library and select committee staff, and process all written submissions, has left the
Scrutiny Unit under pressure. In 2007 it appointed two extra members of staff in response to this
pressure. The Head of the Unit, Matthew Hamlyn, has described the creation of a new
administrative post as ‘essential in handling the extra workload arising from public bill
committees.’
34 The problems for the Scrutiny Unit, however, are most significantly due to the
current mismatch between the people selecting the witnesses (bill teams, whips and, formally, the
programming sub-committee) and the people briefing on the committee sessions (the Scrutiny
Unit, the select committee specialists). The recommendations above would help correct this, as
would the encouragement that all parties liaise with each other from as early on in the process as
possible.
PBCs have no single administrative body. They lack the permanent, committee-specific staff of
select committees, and the concern of the Public Bill Office clerk who sits on each PBC is the
conduct of the proceedings alone. Due to their ad hoc nature, it is hard to argue that PBCs
warrant a secretariat similar to select committees, but greater assistance than is available at
present would lead to improvements in the running of PBCs as well as in what members and
witnesses are able to gain from the process. Two or three extra members of staff should be
hired in the Scrutiny Unit to help the administration of PBCs - with briefing, but also
34 Contained in an Appendix on the work of the Scrutiny Unit in Liaison Committee (2009).45
with drawing up the witness programme if the initial planning meeting is adopted. Non-
government and backbench members of PBCs in particular suffer from a lack of resources to aid
their preparedness for bill scrutiny.
The innovations in the amount of supporting material available to PBC members introduced as a
result of The Legislative Process are to be welcomed. The imminent availability of an online version
of a bill comparing it as amended in PBC with how it was as it went into committee, showing
deletions struck out in red and insertions underlined in blue, is a positive change. It will enable
greater understanding, and even measurement, of the impact of the committee stage. The
introduction of explanatory statements to accompany amendments needs to be made
mandatory; otherwise, their sporadic use makes their effect haphazard. Extra support may be
required for backbenchers to help them draft these statements. This might necessitate
increasing the staff of Public Bill Office (by one or two) so that more dedicated support
during the course of the committee stage can be provided.
Publicity
If public bill committees are well publicised they are more likely to open up the committee stage
to observation and involvement by outside stakeholders. However, in response to a question
about how the general public access information about the timing of PBCs, so that they can
attend a session, or know when to submit written evidence, one official remarked: ‘How does
anybody find out what is going on? It is quite extraordinarily difficult.’ Unlike select committees,
PBCs lack their own publicity machine. They do not issue press releases announcing forthcoming
witness sessions. Part of the problem is that it is unclear who would authorise such coverage. The
chair of a PBC is not the same figure-head as in select committees. He or she is not a position to
speak for the committee. This problem is a consequence of PBCs’ ad hoc nature.
In an attempt to address the problem of publicity, the Scrutiny Unit is piloting alerts to journalists,
asking select committee media officers to send programmes of PBC evidence to the press lists
they have compiled for select committees. The impact of this is unclear. Parliament itself must
promote PBCs more widely. The parliamentary website must make it clearer how and
when individuals and organisations can submit written evidence or put themselves
forward to be considered as witnesses. Even as early as at the first reading of a bill,
appeals for evidence should appear in the Parliamentary News section on the website’s
homepage. Select committee reports receive publicity here. The Scrutiny Unit pages of the
parliamentary website are currently the only place where information about evidence giving can
be found. There is guidance on written evidence, and advice to contact the relevant government
department if an individual or an organisation wants to appear as a witness. But this information
does not appear alongside current bills or give any idea about when the individual should make
contact. The Cabinet Office’s guidance (2009) to ministers and civil service bill teams on the
committee stage suggests that departments begin thinking about witnesses in advance of even
introducing a bill to parliament. To gain a fair chance of accessing and influencing the legislative
process, the public need to know the dates of these windows of influence. Neil Carberry of the
CBI suggested that government departments should remind stakeholders a few months in
advance that the opportunity to give evidence was approaching. Janet Allbeson of Gingerbread
explained that on one occasion her organisation did not submit a written memorandum because
they were not fully aware at the time of how to go about doing this. In the interests of opening
up the legislative process, publicising how and when to submit written evidence is especially
important as this form of evidence is more likely to be utilised by individuals and small groups
rather than by well-funded lobbying organisations. If PBCs adopt the recommendation to hold
an initial full committee planning meeting just after second reading, they would be able to issue a46
press release (including a call for evidence) at the end of this meeting. This may help, but to have
greater impact, publicity must be orchestrated long before this.
Despite now beginning with select committee-style evidence sessions, the legislative committee
stage continues to fail to attract media attention. John Bercow MP was one interviewee who
thought it would be good if BBC Parliament and some members of the specialist press could
become more interested in the process of bills. He suggested holding a briefing on PBCs for the
lobby journalists, at least to disseminate material about how the reformed stage operates. Media
coverage could widen awareness about PBCs, but pressure on the column inches and
broadcasting minutes available to journalists caused by the concentration of parliamentary
business around Tuesdays to Thursdays does not guarantee that PBCs would get any greater
coverage than at present. Ultimately, it must not be forgotten that publicising these committees is
not everything. What matters is getting the legislation right.
Chairmanship
The chairing of PBCs has been one of the discontinuities between what was put forward by the
Modernisation Committee and what was accepted by the House. Some interviewees who had
chaired PBCs expressed their frustration at not being able to intervene on committee proceedings
as chairs are able to in select committees. More than one chair thought the questioning of
witnesses had not been as probing as they would have liked. Having a chair simply as an umpire
has had implications for publicity (as explained above) as well as for PBCs’ ability to develop
much of an esprit de corps.
If the Modernisation Committee’s recommendation to have select committee chairs preside over
PBC evidence-taking had been adopted, these individuals would have been able to bring
experience of this procedur, and subject expertise to the process. Their presence would have the
potential to make PBCs more like select committees, bringing some of the characteristics of
effective committees (see Section 1) to the reformed committee stage. Despite these advantages,
this report does not suggest that such a change be adopted. The involvement of select committee
chairs in the legislative process would distract these individuals from their duties as departmental
and policy scrutinisers. When added to all the other responsibilities these members have as MPs,
it is unlikely they could chair both types of committees in the time available and do both jobs
with sufficient effectiveness. It is also unlikely that a select committee chair alone would be able
to inject the consensual atmosphere of his or her committee into the PBC process. Of course, in
the longer term, if the recommendation of establishing permanent legislative committees were
adopted, many of the advantages seen by the Modernisation Committeee of having expert
decisions would be achieved without putting undue pressure on the select committees.
One senior clerk thought that who chaired PBCs made little practical difference, especially
considering that many MPs would have had select committee experience anyway. Another
interviewee suggested that gaining the respect of fellow committee members and keeping order
were the prime concerns of a PBC chair, and that achieving this was largely due to personality.
From my own observations of PBCs, it is clear that some members of the Chairmen’s Panel are
fully engaged with their responsibilities, though others appeared to be simply going through the
motions. It is the case that if clerks were to have a greater role in witness programming they
would need to do so under the authority of the PBC chair. This may require the chair to take a
more active role in proceedings.47
Bills which start in the House of Lords
The exclusion of bills which start in the House of Lords from powers to hear from witnesses
appears to be an anomaly of the new process. The Modernisation Committee’s inclusion of this
condition was welcomed by the government and emphasised in the debate on The Legislative
Process.
35 It was considered that such bills would have already received substantial debate in the
upper house, where the presence of experts amongst its members would have enhanced the
quality of discussion. The Hansard Society (2008: 222) and some interviewees, however, see the
exclusion of Lords bills from full PBC powers as an oddity. A senior clerk wondered how
justified this was, and another senior figure suspected the arrangement was a consequence of a
concession to the whips. By the time a bill comes to the Commons from the Lords it is quite far
into the parliamentary year. There will be little wish to delay things by having to hear evidence.
If the new PBC process is considered to be a good innovation, as the tone of most evidence
gathered during this investigation would suggest, it is illogical not to apply full evidence-gathering
powers to all programmed government bills. Therefore, moves should be made to extend oral
and written evidence-gathering powers to government bills that start in the House of
Lords and are subject to a programme motion. By contrast, the restrictions on the evidence-
gathering powers of PBCs examining bills that have received pre-legislative scrutiny should
remain. The investigation completed by the committee charged with pre-legislative scrutiny is
likely to be more comprehensive than anything that the PBC will be able to achieve. Likewise
with the Finance Bill, whose committee members can refer to the Treasury Select Committee’s
report on the Budget.
35 House of Commons Hansard, 1 November 2006: cols 304, 307-08.4849
Conclusion
Philip Cowley has argued that the reforms to create PBCs have ‘the potential to do more to
improve the quality of the parliamentary scrutiny of bills than any other Commons reform in the
last twenty…years’ (2007: 22). This investigation’s findings agree with his hopeful assessment. As
a result of the introduction of evidence-gathering legislative committees, the Commons
committee stage has become more informed, more transparent, and characterised by improved
debate. Oral evidence sessions in particular have provided interested organisations and
individuals outside parliament with an additional forum in which to express their views and offer
expert advice and opinions on elements of proposed government legislation. This investigation
found that these groups feel that the quality of what they are able to provide for the committees
is greatly enhanced by being able to expand at length in a witness session rather than rely on
members choosing to read their written briefings.
Witness sessions at the start of the committee stage give committee members unfamiliar with the
subject area a useful introduction to the scrutiny of the bill. The availability of more information
has engaged MPs and empowered backbench members of these committees, who are becoming
more confident to take part in both questioning and debate. Resource innovations in the form of
online legislation gateways and explanatory statements to amendments have also increased the
utility of the committee stage for MPs. Along with introducing the practice of direct questioning
of witnesses (and the minister) in place of probing amendments, PBCs have proved more
efficient than their standing committee predecessors.
One must ask, however, whether the combined effect of these positive changes has been to
render the committee stage more effective, which was the general aim of the Modernisation
Committee’s report. Has the introduction of public bill committees resulted in better scrutiny by
parliament of government legislation, and is the legislation produced of a higher quality as a result?
In support of the positive impact of PBCs, Damian Green MP saw evidence-taking PBCs as
having boosted the standing of Commons scrutiny. Jack Straw MP pointed to a lot more criticism
going towards the government at committee stage to illustrate his opinion that ‘I’m in no doubt
that it is better than what was there before.’
36 The Hansard Society, in their recent examination of
influences on the legislative process, concluded that exchanges between external actors,
parliament and government, like those now provided by the PBC procedure, can make a real
difference to legislative outcomes (2008: 16). Anecdotal evidence gathered for this report ranged
from those who indicated particular bills where evidence of witness statements had fed its way
through to debate at report and third reading
37; and a minister’s assurance that a bill would alter
in the Lords because of evidence gained during the PBC; to those who were doubtful ‘that bills
come out of committee with the government more chastened or bills better than they would have
been under the old process.’ Those sceptical of the impact of PBCs emphasised that ‘if you have
got only one or two day’s evidence you are only scratching the surface.’ Others dismissed the
scrutiny PBCs provide as ‘a pale shadow’ of that performed by select committees.
To fully realise the potential that Cowley writes of, problems with the current PBC system need
to be recognised, and commitments made to bring about the suggested improvements. Timing
problems are central to a legislative committee system that presently does not operate as
effectively as it could. The timetabling straitjacket imposed on PBCs leaves insufficient time to
36 Jack Straw was speaking at the launch of the Hansard Society’s Law in the Making, July 2008, Westminster.
37 See, for example, House of Commons Hansard, 3 December 2007: col. 585. Mike Weir MP (SNP) quoted the
testimony of Hilary Reynolds, the civil servant responsible for the bill. Weir argued, “If we proceed with the Bill as
drafted, no one in their right mind is likely to enter into an agreement that deviates from the child maintenance levels
set out in it, despite the fact that we were clearly told in evidence sessions that many parents wish to consider
alternatives.”50
prepare for these committees and to reflect on what is learnt through evidence-taking before
progressing to line-by-line scrutiny. Both of these problems have the potential to diminish the
quality of scrutiny. The current rush risks leaving members poorly briefed in advance of scrutiny,
witnesses with too little notice to prepare evidence, if they are able to rearrange their diaries to
appear at all, and parliamentary officials under notable pressure. The haste to move from
evidence sittings to detailed scrutiny often has implications for the ability to table informed
amendments in the first session of line-by-line consideration. This report recommends the
inclusion of new time at both of these points to help PBCs realise the effectiveness of the
scrutiny that they have the potential to provide.
The second fundamental problem with the reformed PBC process is the opaque manner in which
witness lists are decided upon. Negotiated through the secretive mechanisms of the usual
channels, witness selection is neither necessarily consensual nor efficient. Witness lists have been
questioned on many occasions by the wider committee, as well as privately by clerks, who worry
at the lack of transparency. There is currently no ownership of PBCs, a factor linked to their ad
hoc status. The whole committee must be involved in deciding whom they will question. Such a
reform would also encourage further engagement on the part of committee members and might
diversify the types of witnesses chosen.
PBC membership continues not to include a reflective spread of opinion and expertise from
across the House of Commons. More effort needs to be made to choose experts and those who
declare an interest, including some select committee members, to sit on PBCs, but changing
those in charge of programming decision-making would more effectively address problems in a
system which currently is made to work, rather than naturally doing so. To achieve this, ideally
the composition of the Committee of Selection should change. More resources would help the
Scrutiny Unit and the Public Bill Office better administer PBCs. Attention also needs to turn to
improving the publicity of these committees. PBCs are an innovation of which parliament ought
to be proud, and they should be promoted accordingly via the parliamentary website. In this vein,
if PBCs are considered to be a good thing, their evidence-gathering powers should be extended
to bills that begin in the House of Lords.
The recommendations of this report can be grouped into those which are relatively small and
quickly achievable, and those that might be considered more aspirational, although no less
important. Extra resources, enhanced publicity, and making explanatory statements on
amendments mandatory are changes that are easily made. So, too, is the replacement of the
programming sub-committee with a whole committee planning meeting, which is one of the
most important reforms suggested here. Recommended changes to the timing of PBCs are no
less important, but may prove more difficult. While accepting that the passage of a bill cannot
run and run, the apparent reluctance to stray from the sessional boundaries adds undue pressure
to the legislative process, which is hampering effective scrutiny. At a minimum, carry-over of bills
ought to be embraced far more enthusiastically than it has been. The introduction of a system of
permanent legislative committees is the most aspirational of the options for reform discussed. Its
establishment would require a cultural shift in attitudes of Westminster politicians to scrutiny, but
this report hopes it may happen in the longer term.
Measuring parliamentary influence can be very difficult. Its effect is often subtle and not readily
quantifiable, but this does not mean it does not exist. This investigation concludes that the move
to PBCs is probably more significant that can be readily realised. A reform such as this has the
potential to alter the attitude of MPs. With encouragement and further modification, it could
contribute to a changed approach to scrutiny and to the role and status of parliament as part of a
wider change in culture. The Hansard Society recognises that the culture at Westminster is
currently based on ‘an uneasy compromise’ (2008: 197) between government control of the51
agenda and parliament’s duty to keep the executive in check. Welcome legislative devices such as
the introduction of PBCs need to be able to flourish in the arena of the party battle. Evidence-
taking is a good addition to the committee stage, but ultimately it will only prove really useful if
all MPs pay attention to what is said. A shift in culture and an acceptance that scrutiny is a good
thing can help ensure this will happen.
It is certainly not intended for this report’s conclusions to be taken as a criticism of Jack Straw
and the Modernisation Committee’s programme of reform. Some of their recommendations were
timid, but perhaps sensibly so. The Legislative Process recognised the need for reform and also that
anything too radical would not be accepted by the House or the whips. Its authors were rewarded
by the acceptance of the vast majority of their recommendations. As a senior clerk reflected, the
introduction of public bill committees has been ‘a step and a half in the right direction.’ It is a
reform that, taken further, can bring important changes to the quality of parliament’s scrutiny of
government. It is a ‘crack’ that provides space for ‘wedges’ that can extend the strengthening of
parliament that has already been achieved (Wright 2004: 870). It deserves to be exploited, and
what better time to do so than now, when the desire to fortify the powers and standing of
parliament is so widespread.5253
Summary of Recommendations
On timing
1. The programme motion moved at the end of second reading should acknowledge the
need to prepare for PBCs by including a minimum gap of two weeks between the end of
second reading and the first evidence-taking session.
2. In order to make evidence-taking worthwhile, time needs to be put aside for members to
absorb the information received. There should be a full week’s gap between the final
witness appearance and the start of line-by-line scrutiny to allow for reflection and the
tabling of informed amendments.
On witnesses and the evidence-gathering process
3. An initial, private meeting of all committee members should be held to decide on the
witness list and the committee’s timetable. This planning session would replace the need
for a programming sub-committee. A week after this planning meeting the whole
committee should reconvene to formally agree the programme motion.
4. The programme motion should be tabled in the name of the PBC chair, who should have
responsibility for determining the committee’s programme.
5. PBCs should be encouraged to use their power to formally invite individuals or
organisations to submit written evidence. The PBC should issue a call for evidence in a
press release immediately after the first planning meeting.
6. Written evidence needs to be received by the PBC as early in the scrutiny process as
possible, in order for committee members to consider its contents and apply what is
learnt to their scrutiny of the bill.
7. If the recommendation to adopt a planning meeting is not accepted, at a minimum, the
whips on the programming sub-committee should be encouraged to consult with the
chair of the relevant select committee about witness choices with the aim of producing a
more informed and valuable witness list.
On membership
8. Membership of PBCs must reflect the balance of views across the House on the subject
of the bill in question, with additional efforts made to seek members with relevant
interest or expertise.
9. The membership of the Committee of Selection should be altered to three whips (one
from each of the main parties), with the rest of its members to be drawn from the
backbenches of each of the main parties. It should continue to be chaired by a
backbencher.54
On resources and administration
10. Two or three extra members of staff should be hired in the Scrutiny Unit to help the
administration of PBCs with the briefing but also with drawing up the witness
programme if the initial planning meeting is adopted.
11. The introduction of explanatory statements to accompany amendments should be made
mandatory. This might necessitate increasing the staff of Public Bill Office (by one or
two), so that more dedicated support during the course of the committee stage can be
provided.
On publicity
12. Parliament itself must promote PBCs more widely. The parliamentary website should
make it clearer how and when individuals and organisations can submit written evidence
or put themselves forward to be considered as witnesses. Even as early as at the first
reading of a bill, appeals for evidence should appear in the Parliamentary News section
on the website’s homepage.
On bills which start in the Lords
13. Moves should be made to extend oral and written evidence-gathering powers to
government bills that start in the House of Lords and are subject to a programme motion.
Adopting a permanent legislative committee system
14. Moving to a system of permanent legislative scrutiny committees, separate from the
existing select committee system, would further strengthen parliament’s powers of
scrutiny. Its adoption should be kept under review.55
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